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1 
The Great Recession, Fallout, 
and What We Learned 
Eskander Alvi
Western Michigan University 
The Great Recession (December 2007–June 2009) roiled financial 
markets around the world and caused significant damage to the global 
economy on a scale that is comparable only to the Great Depression. 
Starting in the United States with the collapse of housing prices, its 
reach expanded quickly to financial markets inside and outside the 
country and soon swamped the international economy. The outsized 
losses in the broader financial sector and the rapid deterioration of the 
pace of aggregate economic activity posed extraordinary challenges on 
many fronts. Not since the 1930s have policymakers been confronted 
with such near-catastrophic events. 
This volume presents five chapters on macro policy challenges in 
the Great Recession from some of the country’s most distinguished 
economists who came to Kalamazoo, Michigan, as part of the fifty-
first Werner Sichel Lecture Series (2014–2015), which was sponsored 
jointly by the Department of Economics at Western Michigan University 
and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. The chapters 
included here follow from their presentations. The idea is that confront-
ing the policy challenges will encourage more discussion and research 
to better instruct future policy in dealing with comparable adversities. 
It is now well understood that the Great Recession was caused 
by a housing bubble that was enabled by easy access to credit and a 
belief that housing prices would not fall. On the supply side, lenders 
secured additional funds by selling their mortgages, which fed into 
strong incentives to lend. Securitization of mortgages became com-
mon and created an aggressive lending cycle that started with lending 
to home buyers, followed by selling the mortgages, which were then 
securitized and sold to investors, leaving lenders with more funds to 
1 
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2 Alvi 
advance to other home buyers. Since the loan originators would pass on 
the mortgages, they had little interest in making sure that the borrowers 
were financially sound. Subprime mortgages that resulted were often 
bundled with prime ones in complex ways, which made the risks less 
transparent. Furthermore, the credit rating agencies deemed the securi-
ties worthy, giving them a seal of approval as a safe investment prod-
uct. The near-collapse of the financial system wreaked havoc on itself 
and the larger global economy. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) note in 
their well-known research, output losses associated with financial cri-
ses can be dreadful and persistent. The 2008 recession lived up to that 
description. 
The authors in this book describe the unprecedented events and 
the often-extraordinary policies put in place to limit the damage and 
turn the economy around. Not surprisingly, some policies worked well 
while others barely made a dent. An analysis of the many lessons and 
encounters, successes and failures, will surely offer fresh perspectives 
on how to manage the economy in a future crisis of comparable pro-
portion. While some research has been conducted on the lessons of the 
Great Recession, an appreciation of the accompanying challenges adds 
value and enriches policy content. The hindsight afforded by the Great 
Recession is invaluable, and in the following five chapters we hope to 
underscore the main issues policymakers faced. 
When beset by a crisis, we are prone to look for precedents in judg-
ing what kinds of policies are likely to be effective. Barry Eichengreen 
offers that viewpoint by drawing analogies between the Great Depres-
sion and the Great Recession and the lessons learned. He also makes a 
connection between politics and fiscal policies, drawing on historical 
precedence. Even in the case of monetary policy, though the central 
bank has much autonomy, the Federal Reserve worries about any poten-
tial compromise of independence if it is at odds with Congress or the 
prevailing political sentiment. The challenges arising from the political 
direction is a common theme in the book, a view that is well positioned 
by Gary Burtless. No discussion of the Great Recession is complete 
without the extraordinary policies taken by the Federal Reserve. Don-
ald Kohn, who was the vice chair at the central bank from 2006 to 2010, 
provides an explicit description of how the Federal Reserve dealt with 
the crisis. Another common theme is the sluggish recovery. Laurence 
Ball and his coauthors take on the lower trend path of potential GDP
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The Great Recession, Fallout, and What We Learned  3 
following the 2008 recession and suggests fiscal stimulus to close that 
gap, arguing that this could be achieved without increasing the pub-
lic debt. The effects of the Great Recession quickly went international, 
with financial crises outside the country often appearing to be worse 
than in the United States. Kathryn Dominguez looks at the financial and 
trade connections to ask if the foreign shocks were responsible for the 
slow recovery in the United States. 
In Chapter 2, Eichengreen presents a historical perspective on les-
sons learned from past crises and how they are applied—and often mis-
applied—in subsequent periods of turmoil. The major precedent—the 
Great Depression of the 1930s—offered a variety of guidelines for poli-
cymakers, from preventing bank runs to providing emergency lending 
and allowing stimulus on the fiscal side. 
Policy did succeed in applying some lessons learned on many 
fronts—on the financial side, it prevented a large-scale bank run, 
aggressively lowering the federal funds rate and provisioning plenty 
of liquidity through both quantitative easing when rates could not go 
any lower and two fiscal stimulus packages to prop up spending. But 
there was also failure in a few critical areas, the most notable being the 
failure of Lehman Brothers. This seriously compromised the lender of 
last resort obligation that the Fed normally maintains and in turn cre-
ated an extraordinary degree of uncertainty regarding which financial 
institution might fail next. Both Eichengreen and Burtless point to the 
political climate of blame that may have been partly responsible—the 
public perceived that the Federal Reserve was bailing out large banks 
responsible for bringing about financial chaos, while homeowners with 
bad mortgages and folks on Main Street were left in the lurch. 
The central bank’s large-scale purchase of mortgage-backed securi-
ties was also viewed with apprehension in some quarters. There was 
concern that it looked much like the elements leading up to the housing 
bubble. To be sure, the housing market after the collapse did benefit 
from the injection of direct liquidity, money that would normally not 
flow in that direction because of extraordinary risks. Restoring supply 
offered a much-needed lifeline to the mortgage and refinance market. 
Political disenfranchisement aside, it is also hard to deny that a recogni-
tion of moral hazard was at play, that the Federal Reserve would not try 
enough to corral a potential buyer for Lehman Brothers. Following the 
purchase of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan Chase with a $30 billion loan 
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4 Alvi 
from the Federal Reserve, one wonders how much more a prospective 
buyer would require and whether that amount would be forthcoming. 
The second shortcoming both Eichengreen and Burtless refer to is 
that policymakers did not gauge the magnitude of the missteps. Once 
Lehman Brothers failed, the financial sector entered a renewed vicious 
phase of panic and uncertainty, the extent of which policy formula-
tors had not anticipated. After the fact, though, central banks in the 
United States and Europe worked hard to restore confidence, sparing 
no resource to shore up the ailing institutions, which suggests they may 
have miscalculated the fallout from Lehman’s demise. Perhaps because 
Lehman was not a depository bank, the lessons from the Great Depres-
sion did not quite instruct policy in the Great Recession. A related defi-
ciency, though on a different scale, was that while a housing bubble 
was recognized early on, the scope and magnitude of the damage it 
would bring to the real economy was not. The common policy view was 
that any macro damage from the housing debacle would be limited. It 
was not fully appreciated that extensive securitization of mortgages had 
spread the risks well beyond the housing market. Because of the ease 
of securitizing, lenders had an incentive to lend aggressively and pass 
on the risks to buyers and holders of mortgage-backed securities. Such 
risks were not properly priced, which became apparent only after the 
collapse of house prices. In sum, policymakers had underestimated the 
risks of their own missteps, as with the failure of Lehman, and did not 
properly identify the broadening macro risks arising from the housing 
market. 
The third shortcoming was that although averting a disaster on the 
scale and enormity of the Great Depression was reason for gratification, 
that success planted the seeds for policy reversion. Once the economy 
had stabilized with 10 percent unemployment and growth resumed, 
although tepid, policymakers breathed a sigh of relief and eased their 
policy efforts too soon. Eichengreen and Burtless argue that at this junc-
ture the urgency for a continuation of policy receded and deficit and 
debt worries surfaced. In the United States, a $1.2 trillion spending cut 
over 10 years was approved in 2011, the Bush tax cuts elapsed, and 
the sequester—8.5 percent cut in federal spending across the board— 
was put in place in 2013. Eichengreen argues that the turn to austerity 
was even more pronounced in Europe, with euro area deficits falling 
sharply in 2012, despite the return to a recession, while in the U.K. its 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be 
set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your                               
Customer Service Representative if you have questions about fnding this option.
Job Name: -- /402798t
 
 
 
The Great Recession, Fallout, and What We Learned  5 
government turned to fiscal consolidation. Central banks also became 
reticent after the first stint of victory. The Federal Reserve was cautious 
in expanding its unconventional measures, waiting until its third round 
of quantitative easing to make open-ended asset purchases. In 2010 the 
European Central Bank began to phase out unconventional measures, 
followed by two premature interest rate increases in 2011. 
In Chapter 3, Burtless considers the political fallout from the reces-
sion and the subsequent challenges for policy in generating an appropri-
ate pace of recovery. He argues that while monetary policy was active, 
the fiscal side was rather restrained. Following two fiscal stimulus pack-
ages, one in late 2008 and the other in early 2009, there were heightened 
concerns of unsustainable government debt and a severe public back-
lash. The perception was that the dollars were being misused to bail out 
large banks and that the large deficits would be ruinous to the economy. 
To be sure, the Troubled Asset Relief Program did involve the Treasury 
buying stocks of distressed financial corporations, but the amount was 
a fairly small percentage of the overall fiscal stimulus, and in fact, the 
Treasury did not lose money on this particular undertaking. Nonethe-
less, political sentiment did not support any additional stimulus even 
though it gradually became clear that the recession was more severe 
than originally thought. Burtless also observes that once the financial 
sector stabilized, with the panic there retreating, the willingness to pass 
any additional stimulus to reduce unemployment simply dissipated. 
This reaction is not unusual, Burtless notes in comparing with events in 
some Western European countries that had high but stable unemploy-
ment rates in the 1980s. Once the threat of layoffs ebbs, the motivation 
to pass new measures to prop up employment also withers. 
The institutional setup of fiscal and monetary policies is differ-
ent. With monetary decision-making delegated to mostly seven vot-
ing members of the Federal Reserve Board, policy actions are usually 
swift. Fiscal policy, in contrast, is determined in the political arena with 
wider debate and requires approval of both houses of Congress. This 
often leads to delays and lags. The mix of fast-acting monetary policy 
with unhurried fiscal policy is generally a good balance. When a major 
shock like the Great Depression or the Great Recession strikes, how-
ever, monetary policy alone may not suffice, and promptness on the 
fiscal side may be warranted. With interest rates at zero, this was clearly 
such a scenario. Burtless argues that, with fiscal policy passage subject 
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to political jostling, even in times of great need, as in the Great Reces-
sion, the prospect of stimulus can be tardy and unreliable. Additionally, 
the window of action is often short and closes once the peril of ris-
ing layoffs has passed, even though the unemployment rate can remain 
high. This challenge that Burtless identifies clearly bears recognizing 
as a constraint on policy timing and possible options for fiscal action. 
Monetary policy played a key role in stabilizing the economy. In 
Chapter 4, Donald Kohn describes the new and not-so-new policies that 
were put in place. One of the challenges he describes was that institu-
tions in the financial maelstrom were not banks. Securitization, often 
involving subprime mortgages, had drawn in a variety of financial insti-
tutions that did not take deposits and therefore were not subject to close 
supervision. With subprime mortgages packaged in obscure ways, it 
was difficult to know where the losses would ultimately accrue follow-
ing the collapse of the housing market. The feedback between the finan-
cial and the real sectors meant financial institutions under stress needed 
to sell assets, often at fire-sale prices, which would drive down asset 
prices, including house prices, and increase foreclosures, which would 
further adversely impact the financial sector. Kohn notes that the central 
bank was not particularly equipped to deal with such a crisis. Under 
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the Fed is not able to directly lend to 
households and businesses, but it could act in the financial market to 
reduce the stress and end the fire sale of assets, which would be a relief 
to both Wall Street and Main Street. To stop the financial implosion, 
in 2008 the Fed started to lend to nonbank institutions, something it 
had not done since the 1930s. This broad provisioning included broker-
dealers, money market funds, issuers of commercial paper, and buyers 
of securitized debt. 
Securitization also spread the risks to foreign banks through their 
purchase of securitized debts that were funded by short-term deposits 
and borrowings in foreign currencies that were later converted to dol-
lars in swap markets. With the crisis deepening, access to swaps became 
difficult so they had to bid directly for dollars, which put upward pres-
sure on interest rates. To ease the situation the Fed created central bank 
foreign currency liquidity swaps—it directly lent dollars to foreign cen-
tral banks so that they could lend where appropriate to their banks. The 
extension of risks to nonbanks and foreign financial institutions posed 
particularly acute challenges for policymakers. 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be 
set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your                               
Customer Service Representative if you have questions about fnding this option.
Job Name: -- /402798t
 
 
 
The Great Recession, Fallout, and What We Learned  7 
A well-known special challenge facing the central bank was posed 
by having reached the zero lower bound—the federal funds rate could 
not be lowered. This was possibly the biggest hurdle for monetary pol-
icy. In late 2008 and early 2009, the Fed purchased long-term assets 
composed of government bonds and mortgage-backed securities. This 
came to be known as quantitative easing. The Fed first bought mortgage 
securities in 1971, following legislation that amended section 14(b) of 
the Federal Reserve Act, which allowed the central bank to buy and sell 
in the open market mortgage securities that were fully guaranteed by 
an agency of the U.S. government. When Congress passed that legisla-
tion, essentially to ease funding in the housing market, the central bank 
was uncomfortable in that role, and in 1981 made the last purchase of 
agency debt before the Great Recession (Haltom and Sharp 2014). The 
size of asset purchases in the Great Recession, including that of mort-
gage securities, is unprecedented. However, as Kohn points out, this 
was an example of a policy that was in the books but long remained dor-
mant, and was put to vigorous use in this recession. It could be argued, 
by comparison with the 1970s, that the central bank was easing from a 
situation of exigency rather than normalcy and was evidently less reluc-
tant in exercising that option. 
The Federal Reserve also introduced forward guidance—promising 
to keep the Fed funds rate near the floor for prolonged periods, or until 
certain inflation and unemployment targets were met. This effectively 
tethered the future Fed funds rate and removed any perceived upward 
bias from the central bank’s actions going forward. The combination 
of asset purchase and forward guidance kept longer-term interest rates 
low and favorably impacted asset prices, including house prices, and 
encouraged consumer and business spending. Some of the monetary 
policy measures discussed here started under Fed Chair Ben Benanke 
and continued under the stewardship of Chair Janet Yellen. 
It is useful to note that in the variety of efforts to stabilize the econ-
omy, the Fed did not deviate from its usual inflation and unemployment 
targets—2 percent and full-employment, though it has been argued by 
some economists that a higher inflation target would provide a stronger 
boost to aggregate demand. Perhaps the Fed was not comfortable alter-
ing the key anchor of monetary policy, an action that would signal a 
different policy regime and risk confusion about its commitment to low 
inflation. On the unemployment side, with the natural rate being strictly 
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8 Alvi 
unknown, the Fed showed a willingness to continue with low interest 
rates until inflation reached its threshold, rather than raise rates once the 
unemployment rate reached a predetermined level. This approach let 
the actual unemployment rate reach 4.3 percent in May 2017. 
Kohn argues that communicating the purpose and scope of the poli-
cies turned out to be a serious challenge—it was difficult to explain that 
the Federal Reserve was not bailing out failing institutions but rather 
providing liquidity to keep the banking and the larger financial system 
functional. Confusion among the public and in Congress created sus-
picion and made it difficult to execute policy as needed. It would have 
been helpful to have had a process to explain the scope of the problem 
and what has to be done and why, possibly along the lines of the Fed 
chair directly communicating to the public via the media, something 
Bernanke had done on a couple of occasions. 
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, GDP growth remained slug-
gish. The disappointing recovery is central to Chapter 5, by Laurence 
Ball, J. Bradford DeLong, and Lawrence H. Summers. The authors 
focus on potential GDP and note that its revision was noticeably below 
the counterpart based on pre-2008 trends, about 7 percent lower, and 
that estimates by Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013) and the 
Congressional Budget Office (2014) suggest that about two-thirds of 
the loss was permanent in nature. In the face of high unemployment and 
the economy’s infrastructure in need of upgrade and repair, the authors 
propose closing this potential GDP gap by use of fiscal measures. Their 
choice of fiscal makes good sense given that monetary policy had 
reached the zero lower bound. In that liquidity trap scenario, an argu-
ment is made that a properly designed stimulus would likely reduce 
rather than increase the debt burden, the logic being that a stimulus 
would directly raise revenue and in turn lower the debt/GDP ratio, cre-
ate positive supply effects of public investment, and possibly lead to 
reductions in real interest costs arising from an increase in expected 
inflation. Additionally, the debt problem that is normally associated 
with tax cuts would be mitigated by the hysteresis effects of rising out-
put and employment. Thus, Ball and his coauthors make the forceful 
argument that with interest rates so low, crowding out would not dilute 
the expansionary effort and a tax cut would pay for itself. 
Referring to some simple calculations by DeLong and Summers 
(2012), Ball et al. reason that a hysteresis parameter of 0.05 (a $1.00 
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The Great Recession, Fallout, and What We Learned  9 
increase in current output having a positive effect of $0.05 on poten-
tial output) via investment, employment, and other favorable effects 
would suffice in leaving the national debt unchanged in the face of a 
tax break. The policy challenge here is that with interest rates at their 
historic lows, this would be a great opportunity for the government to 
cut taxes and borrow to fund infrastructure. But the political process 
that is essential to the tax and spend changes may not cooperate, leaving 
the central bank to continue to assume almost singlehandedly the task 
of lifting the economy. 
The Great Recession started in the United States but spread to other 
countries through financial and trade linkages. A high degree of finan-
cial integration between developed countries meant a synchronous 
effect of the U.S. financial fallout on other countries. Trade was a sec-
ond channel that transmitted the adverse consequence across nations. In 
Chapter 6, Kathryn M.E. Dominguez also notes that the recession was 
especially severe because of its financial origins, pointing to research 
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), who document the vicious effects on 
the economy compared to other kinds of recessions. In an integrated 
system, this can be disastrous both in the size of the downturn and 
its duration, as exemplified by the Great Depression. Fortunately, in 
the Great Recession both fiscal and monetary policy were aggressive, 
which limited the downside. However, on the issue of recovery, she 
notes, the Great Recession seriously lagged compared to its predeces-
sors (recoveries across the past 11 recessions). 
Dominguez maintains that one reason for the weak revival was 
unfavorable transnational effects. Whereas the United States was weak, 
the rest of the world was weaker. What appeared to be the beginning 
of a healthy rebound near the end of 2009 proved to be too optimistic. 
Europe’s financial and fiscal difficulties were becoming full blown, and 
by 2011 the tsunami and earthquake in Japan and the fiscal impasse 
in the United States led to considerable revisions of growth forecasts. 
Japan’s return to recession in 2013 and again in 2014, combined with 
the Russian ruble crisis, created enough downside momentum to limit 
growth in the United States. To examine the reasons for the slow recov-
ery, Dominguez and Shapiro (2013) use forecast revisions and narra-
tive information from contemporaneous news reports. They find that 
shocks originating from Europe were the cause between 2010 and 
2012. Updating the narrative evidence through 2014 and including a 
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broader group of countries, Dominguez finds that the focus shifts from 
the United States in 2008–2009 to the Eurozone in 2010, Asia in 2011, 
and Russia in 2014. 
Transmission of shocks across borders creates a special kind of vul-
nerability and poses a challenge for policy. During the recession, there 
was some cooperation between the Federal Reserve and major central 
banks. An example, as mentioned earlier, was the establishment of 
swap lines, which several foreign banks used. But more general coordi-
nation is tricky, since shocks have diverse origins and require different 
policy responses that are not easy to complement. The tsunami in Japan 
in 2011 required a very geographically targeted fiscal response by the 
Japanese government, while bank bailouts in Southern Europe involved 
the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund. The low interest rate policy in the United States clearly 
helped, but it would be difficult to argue that Federal Reserve should 
lower rates because of the negative external events, though perhaps the 
timing of any change in interest policy can be amenable. 
The chapters presented here offer an account of the lessons and con-
current challenges faced by policymakers in the 2008 recession. While 
the lessons discussed are mostly economic, they are almost always seen 
by both policymakers and the public through the lens of history, poli-
tics, and institutions. This often made navigating the course difficult in 
the recession and presented additional hurdles. One of the contributions 
of this book is not only a better understanding of the lessons but also 
of their nuances, limitations, and boundaries. This balance, it is hoped, 
will better guide future policy in situations of similar distress. 
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2 
The Great Depression 
and the Great Recession 
in a Historical Mirror 
Barry Eichengreen 
University of California, Berkeley 
History is a lens through which we—the public and elected and 
appointed officials—view current problems. The logic of historical 
analogy is never more compelling than during crises, as there is no time 
for careful analytical reasoning and no time for building formal models 
or testing them for fitness to data. In such circumstances, the influence 
of reasoning by analogy, particularly historical analogy, is considerable. 
For example, foreign policy specialists point to the powerful influence 
of the Munich analogy in President Truman’s decision to intervene in 
Korea.1 Or, think of the power of the analogy between 9/11 and Pearl 
Harbor, for which a Google search produces nearly 100,000 hits. 
So it was with the Great Recession of 2008–2009 and the Great 
Depression of 1929–1933, the two great macroeconomic crises of the 
past century. There is no doubt that conventional wisdom about the 
earlier episode, which is referred to colloquially as “the lessons of the 
Great Depression,” powerfully shaped and informed the response to the 
crisis of 2008–2009.2 
The decisions of policymakers were powerfully shaped and 
informed by received wisdom about the mistakes of their predecessors. 
In the 1930s when the crisis hit, those predecessors had succumbed to 
the protectionist temptation. They had cut public spending at the worst 
possible time and failed to stabilize the money supply. Neglecting their 
responsibility for financial stability, they had failed to provide emer-
gency liquidity to the banking system. The result was collapsing banks, 
collapsing prices, collapsing trade, and collapsing activity—in a phrase, 
the great macroeconomic catastrophe of modern times. 
13 
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14 Eichengreen 
That this economic crisis reflected disastrous but avoidable policy 
failures became conventional wisdom, courtesy of influential analyses 
from economists such as Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, whose 
book Monetary History of the United States devoted a 110-page chap-
ter to the episode they dubbed “The Great Contraction” (Friedman and 
Schwartz 1963). In 2008, heeding the lessons of this earlier episode, 
policymakers vowed to do better. If their predecessors’ failure to pro-
vide emergency liquidity had produced a cataclysmic banking and 
financial crisis, then this time they would flood the markets with liquid-
ity and otherwise provide emergency assistance to the banks. If the fail-
ure of those predecessors to stabilize the money supply had resulted 
in a destructive deflation, then this time they would cut interest rates 
and expand central bank balance sheets. If efforts to balance budgets 
had worsened the earlier slump, then this time they would apply fiscal 
stimulus instead. 
As a result of this very different response, unemployment in the 
United States peaked in 2010 at just 10 percent. This was still pain-
fully high, to be sure, but it was far below the catastrophic 24 percent 
scaled in the Great Depression. This time failed banks numbered in the 
hundreds, not thousands. While dislocations were widespread, the utter 
collapse of financial markets, as in the 1930s, was successfully averted. 
And what was true of the United States was true also of other coun-
tries. Every unhappy country is unhappy in its own way, and there were 
varying degrees of economic unhappiness starting in 2008. But, a few 
ill-starred European countries notwithstanding, that unhappiness did 
not rise to 1930s levels. Because policy was better, the decline in output 
and employment was less steep, the social dislocations were fewer, and 
the pain and suffering were less. 
Unfortunately, this happy narrative of sage policy informed by 
“the lessons of history” is a bit too positive. For one thing, it is hard 
to square with the failure to anticipate the risks. As Queen Elizabeth II 
famously asked on a visit to the London School of Economics in 2008: 
“Why did no one see it coming?” (Pierce 2008). Some economists later 
claimed that they had seen “it” coming (Telegraph 2009), but they actu-
ally warned of crises that did not occur, like a collapse of the dollar, or 
issued only vague warnings and without pointing to specific risks. 
That even specialists on financial crises did not sound louder warn-
ings—there’s my mea culpa—suggests adopting a somewhat less criti-
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The Great Depression and the Great Recession in a Historical Mirror 15 
cal posture toward officials in the 1920s for failing to anticipate and 
head off the risks that resulted in their crisis. Our failure reflects what 
psychologists refer to as “continuity bias,” the subconscious tendency 
to believe that the future will resemble the relatively recent past (Omer 
and Alon 1994).3 It reflects peer pressure to conform and the costs of 
being ostracized if, for example, you criticized Alan Greenspan’s finan-
cial stewardship at Jackson Hole in 2005, as one academic was reckless 
enough to do (Rajan 2005). It reflects the power of a dominant ideology, 
in this case the ideology of market efficiency and financial liberaliza-
tion (Patomaki 2009; Suarez and Kolodny 2011). And it reflects the 
influence of money politics—the influence of big financial institutions, 
through their political contributions and the revolving door between 
Wall Street and Washington—in shaping the policy debate (Igan and 
Mishra 2011; Igan, Mishra, and Tressel 2011; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 
2010). 
Ultimately, however, I would argue that the roots of this failure to 
see the recent crisis coming lay in the same progressive narrative of the 
Great Depression. Entirely correctible flaws of collective decision mak-
ing, that narrative explained, had been responsible for the inability of 
contemporaries to appreciate the risks to stability in the 1920s and then 
for their failure to deal effectively with the consequences in the 1930s. 
Modern-day policymakers had learned from the mistakes of their pre-
decessors. Scientific central banking informed by a rigorous framework 
of inflation targeting now reduced economic and financial volatility and 
prevented serious imbalances. Advances in supervision and regulation 
limited financial excesses. Deposit insurance, put in place in response 
to the experience of the 1930s, had eliminated the danger of bank runs 
and financial panics. Conventional wisdom about the Great Depression, 
that it was caused by avoidable policy failures, was itself conducive to 
the belief that those failures could be and, indeed, had been corrected. It 
followed that no comparable crisis was possible now. All of which we 
now know was dreadfully wrong. 
Part of the problem is that we—in this case I mean we economic 
historians—had always done a better job of explaining the course of the 
Great Depression than we had in explaining its onset.4 We had failed to 
highlight how rapid financial innovation had combined with inadequate 
regulation and lax monetary policy to create dangerous financial fragili-
ties.5 We had failed to explain how capital flows to one half of Europe 
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16 Eichengreen 
from the other half of Europe and the rest of the world had set up that 
continent for a fall.6 We had failed to explain how the naïve belief that 
advances in scientific central banking had rendered crises a thing of 
the past, which led contemporaries to discount the risks to financial 
stability (however, see Barber [1985]). We had failed to explain how 
a long period of stability—in the 1920s they called it “the New Era” 
rather than, as recently, the Great Moderation, although the underlying 
phenomenon was fundamentally the same—encouraged excessive risk 
taking and empowered those who argued against stricter regulation.7 
Recent experience suggests the need to write this history more care-
fully. Had we done so earlier, we might have seen more clearly how the 
same factors were at work in the early twenty-first century. 
The fateful decision to let Lehman Brothers fail—the single event 
that most threatened the stability of global financial markets—also sug-
gests looking at the 1920s differently. Lehman failed because it was 
insolvent—because its managers had made bad bets. It failed because 
there were doubts about whether the Fed and Treasury had the legal 
authority to rescue it.8 But it also failed because policymakers wanted 
to make a statement. Having bailed out Bear Stearns six months earlier, 
they were eager to signal that not everyone would be rescued. And they 
wanted to shield themselves from criticism from politicians that they 
were too quick to bail out troubled banks.9 
Because they lived through this experience, future historians are 
likely to write the history of the Great Depression differently. They will 
be reminded that the banking crises of the 1930s reflected not only the 
fact that central banks and governments failed to appreciate the need to 
act as lenders of last resort, but, as with Lehman Brothers, their concern 
with moral hazard and wish to push back against political criticism. 
The great banking crisis of early 1933 resulted from the failure of the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation to rescue Henry Ford’s Guardian 
Group of banks, unleashing a panic that engulfed first the state of Mich-
igan and then the rest of the country.10 In fact, that decision reflected the 
criticism to which U.S. politicians, from President Herbert Hoover on 
down, had been subjected for rescuing Central Republic Trust, the bank 
of former Vice President (and former Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion head) Charles Dawes, six months earlier (Vickers 2011). We are 
reminded that this instinctual desire to “teach them a lesson,” to play 
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financial hardball, especially when doing so is a way for officials to 
rescue their reputations, is deeply ingrained. 
There was also the failure to anticipate how disruptive the failure 
of Lehman Brothers would be. Here too I would blame the “lessons of 
the Great Depression.” The conventional narrative about the Depres-
sion focused on the disruptive impact of bank failures and runs by 
retail depositors.11 Lehman was not a deposit-taking bank; it did not 
have retail depositors.12 Therefore, the conclusion followed, its failure 
couldn’t pose such serious problems. 
This view, informed by the lessons of the Great Depression, was 
why the Basel Accord setting capital standards for internationally active 
financial institutions focused on commercial banks. Deposit insur-
ance, which was supposed to prevent bank runs, focused on commer-
cial banks. Regulation generally focused on commercial banks. This 
focus neglected the shadow banking system of investment banks, hedge 
funds, money market funds, commercial paper issuers, and securitiz-
ers. It ignored Lehman’s derivatives positions. It ignored the fact that 
wholesale creditors could effectively run on the bank. The result was the 
decision to allow the uncontrolled failure of Lehman Brothers, which 
in my view was the single most serious mistake of the financial crisis. 
At this point policymakers realized that they had a situation on their 
hands—that the U.S. and world economies were on the verge of another 
Great Depression. The leaders of the advanced industrial countries 
quickly issued a joint statement that no systematically significant finan-
cial institution would be allowed to fail. American International Group 
(AIG) was bailed out, albeit not on terms that satisfied everyone con-
cerned.13 A reluctant U.S. Congress passed the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program on the second try, to aid the banking and financial system. 
Gordon Brown assembled the Group of Twenty countries in London in 
February 2009 to produce their so-called “Trillion Dollar Package” of 
coordinated fiscal-stimulus measures.14 One after another, governments 
took steps to provide capital and liquidity to distressed financial institu-
tions. Central banks flooded financial markets with liquidity. Policy-
makers congratulated themselves that they had avoided another Great 
Depression.15 
Yet the results of these policy initiatives were decidedly less than 
triumphal. Postcrisis recovery in the United States was lethargic. It pro-
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18 Eichengreen 
ceeded at less than half the pace of a normal recovery, a couple of quar-
ters of exceptionally rapid growth in the middle of 2014 notwithstand-
ing to the contrary. Europe did even worse, experiencing a double-dip 
recession and renewed crisis starting in 2010. 
This was not the successful stabilization and vigorous recovery 
promised by those who had learned the lessons of history.16 The reasons 
why are no mystery. Starting in 2010 the United States and Europe took 
a hard right turn toward austerity. Spending under the American Recov-
ery and Investment Act, President Obama’s stimulus program, peaked 
in fiscal year 2010 and then headed steadily downward. In the summer 
of 2011, the Obama Administration and the Congress then agreed to 
$1.2 trillion of spending cuts to be implemented over 10 years. In 2013 
came expiry of the Bush tax cuts; the end of the temporary reduction 
in employee contributions to the Social Security Trust Fund; and the 
sequester (the across-the-board 8.5 percent cut in federal government 
spending). All this took a big bite out of spending, aggregate demand, 
and economic growth.17 
In Europe the turn was even more dramatic. In Greece, where spend-
ing was out of control, a dose of austerity was clearly required. But the 
adjustment program on which the country embarked starting in 2010 
under the watchful eyes of the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund was unprec-
edented. It required the Greek government to reduce spending and raise 
taxes by an extraordinary 16 percent of GDP over four years—in effect, 
to eliminate more than one-seventh of all spending in the Greek econ-
omy. The governments of the euro area as a whole cut budget deficits 
modestly in 2011 and then sharply in 2012, despite the fact that the 
currency area was back in recession and other forms of spending were 
stagnant. Even the United Kingdom, which had the flexibility afforded 
by a national currency and a national central bank, embarked on an 
ambitious program of fiscal consolidation, cutting government spend-
ing and raising taxes by a cumulative 5 percent of GDP.18 
Central banks, having taken a variety of exceptional steps in the 
crisis, were similarly anxious to return to business as usual. The Fed 
undertook three rounds of quantitative easing (QE)—multimonth pur-
chases of Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities—but hesi-
tated to ramp up those purchases even further despite an inflation rate 
that undershot its 2 percent target and growth that continued to disap-
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point for three additional years. Not until QE3 did it finally make the 
kind of open-ended commitment sufficient to vanquish the threat of 
deflation once and for all.19 
And if the Fed was reluctant to do more, the ECB was eager to do 
less. In 2010 it prematurely concluded that recovery was at hand and 
started phasing out its nonstandard measures. In 2011 it raised interest 
rates twice. Anyone seeking to understand why the European economy 
failed to recover and instead dipped a second time need look no further. 
What lessons, historical or otherwise, informed this extraordinary 
turn of events? For central banks there was, as always, deeply ingrained 
fear of inflation. That fear was nowhere deeper than in Germany, given 
memories of hyperinflation in 1923. German fear now translated into 
European policy, given the Bundesbank-like structure of the ECB and 
the desire of its French president, Jean-Claude Trichet, to demonstrate 
that he was as Teutonic an inflation fighter as any German.20 
The United States had not experienced hyperinflation in the 1920s, 
nor at any other time for that matter, but this did not prevent over-
wrought commentators from warning that Weimar was right around 
the corner.21 The lesson from the 1930s—that when the economy is in 
near-depression conditions with interest rates at zero and ample excess 
capacity, the central bank can expand its balance sheet without igniting 
inflation—was lost from view. Sophisticated central bankers such as 
Chairman Bernanke clearly knew better, but there is no doubt that they 
were influenced by the criticism. The more hysterical the commentary, 
the more loudly the Congress accused the Fed of debasing the currency. 
The more Fed governors then feared for their independence. This ren-
dered them anxious to start shrinking the Fed’s balance sheet toward 
normal levels before there was anything resembling a normal economy. 
This criticism was more intense to the extent that unconventional 
policies had gotten central bankers into places they didn’t belong, like 
the market for mortgage-backed securities (Cecchetti 2009). The lon-
ger the Fed continued purchasing mortgage-backed securities—and it 
continued into 2014—the more the institution’s critics complained that 
policy was setting the stage for another housing bubble and another 
crash. This, of course, was the same preoccupation with moral hazard 
that had contributed to the disastrous decision not to rescue Lehman 
Brothers. In the case of the ECB, of course, the moral-hazard worry 
centered not on the markets but on the politicians. For the central bank 
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20 Eichengreen 
to do more to support growth would just relieve the pressure on gov-
ernments, allowing reforms to lag and risks to accumulate. The ECB 
allowed itself to be backed into a corner where it was the enforcer of 
fiscal consolidation and structural reform. And in its role as enforcer, 
economic growth became the enemy. 
In the case of fiscal policy, the argument for continued stimulus 
was weakened by its failure to deliver everything promised, whether 
because politicians were prone to overpromising or because the shock 
to the economy was even worse than understood at the time.22 There 
was the failure to distinguish how bad conditions were from how much 
worse they would have been without the policy. There was the failure 
to distinguish the need for medium-term consolidation from the need 
for public support for spending in the short term. There was the failure 
to distinguish the need for fiscal consolidation in countries with gaping 
deficits and debts, like Greece, from the situation of countries with the 
space to do more, like Germany. Thus, a range of factors came together. 
The one thing they had in common was failure. 
Inevitably, failures like these have multiple causes. There was the 
dominance of ideology and politics over economics analysis. There was 
the failure of economists to effectively make the case for better poli-
cies. There was the tendency of economists to forget as many lessons 
of the 1930s as they remembered. But the most powerful factor in this 
premature decision to abandon policies that would have done more to 
support the economy when the economy still needed support was surely 
that policymakers had prevented the worst. They had avoided another 
Great Depression. They could declare the emergency over. They could 
therefore heed the call for an early return to normal policies. The irony 
is that their very success in preventing a 1930s-like economic collapse 
led to their failure to support a more vigorous recovery. 
And what was true of macroeconomic policy was also true of finan-
cial reform. In the United States, the Great Depression led to the Glass-
Steagall Act separating commercial from investment banking. It led to 
the adoption of federal deposit insurance. It led to the creation of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to oversee the operation of secu-
rities markets, putting paid to the myth of market self-regulation. There 
were calls now for a new Glass-Steagall, the earlier act having been 
laid to rest in 1999, but there was nothing remotely resembling such 
far-reaching regulatory reform. 
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The Great Depression and the Great Recession in a Historical Mirror 21 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010 contained some modestly useful measures, from the Volcker 
Rule limiting speculative trading by financial institutions to the creation 
of a Consumer Financial Products Bureau. But the big banks were not 
broken up. Rhetoric to the contrary, little was done about the problem of 
too big to fail (Gormley, Johnson, and Rhee 2015). There was nothing 
approaching the thorough-going redrawing of the financial landscape 
that resulted from Glass-Steagall’s sharp separation of commercial 
banking, securities underwriting, and insurance services.23 
The fundamental explanation for the difference is again the suc-
cess of policymakers in preventing the worst. In the 1930s, the depth of 
the Depression and the collapse of banks and financial markets wholly 
discredited the prevailing regime. This time depression and financial 
collapse were avoided, if barely. This fostered the belief that the flaws 
of the prevailing system were less. It weakened the argument for radical 
action, took the wind out of the reformers’ sails, allowed the banks to 
regroup, and allowed petty disagreements among politicians to slow the 
reform effort. Success thus became the mother of failure. 
To be clear, the argument is not that it would have been better to 
allow the big banks to collapse in late 2008 and early 2009. The con-
sequences for output and employment would have been devastating. 
Avoiding those devastating consequences and limiting unemployment 
to 10 percent was a considerable achievement, under the circumstances. 
But it was an achievement with unintended consequences. 
The same is true of Europe’s failure to embark on more far-reaching 
financial reform. This reflected the difficulty of decision making in a 
European Union of 27 countries. But it also reflected the fact that the 
EU did just enough to hold its monetary union together. Through emer-
gency loans and the creation of an ECB facility to buy the bonds of 
troubled governments, it did just enough to prevent the euro system 
from falling apart. This success in turn limited the urgency of proceed-
ing with more far-reaching reform, from across-the-board debt write-
downs to creation of a banking union with a single supervisor for all 
of Europe’s banks and a mechanism for directly recapitalizing troubled 
financial institutions. 
Thus, the very success with which policymakers limited the dam-
age from the worst financial crisis in 80 years means that we are likely 
to see another such crisis in considerably less than 80 years. 
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22 Eichengreen 
This chapter would be incomplete if it didn’t address more about 
Europe and the euro, given how the euro crisis became the second leg 
of the global financial crisis. The decision to create the euro in 1999 was 
one of the greatest economic policy blunders of the twentieth century. 
(A fitting way, some would say, to bring a century of great economic 
policy blunders to a close.) In this case, unlike the 2008 crisis, some of 
us like to think—to echo Queen Elizabeth—that we saw it coming: I’m 
fond of citing my own 1993 article in which I warned of the dangers of 
creating a monetary union without a banking union, not that this much 
affected the course of events (Eichengreen 1993). 
This decision to go ahead with the euro is another example of 
the misuses of history—in this case, of the ability of policymakers to 
cherry-pick their historical analogies. They argued that financial insta-
bility and even World War II, indirectly, had been caused by the com-
petitive devaluations of the 1930s, and not by the rigid gold standard 
system that preceded them, implying that the risk in the 1990s was 
competitive devaluations rather than the premature creation of a new 
gold-standard-like system. John F. Kennedy, when contemplating how 
to respond to the Cuban Missile crisis, considered a range of historical 
analogies, from Pearl Harbor to the 1948–1949 Berlin Blockade and the 
1956 Suez Crisis, and tested them for fitness to the situation at hand. 
Exceptionally, he had historians like Arthur Schlesinger in his kitchen 
cabinet (much as Barack Obama had Christina Romer). Harry Truman, 
who relied only on the analogy with Munich, did not. He had one anal-
ogy and pushed it for all it was worth. So too did the architects of the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
The analogy between the gold standard and the euro system became 
clearer with the onset of the euro crisis, triggered by revelations about 
Greece’s debt and deficits in late 2009. Just as the gold standard pre-
vented national governments and monetary authorities from respond-
ing in the 1930s in stabilizing ways, it now became clear that the euro 
system posed similar obstacles.24 That earlier conflict had been resolved 
by abandoning the gold standard, leading many observers to predict that 
this one would be similarly resolved by abandoning the euro.25 
This, it turned out, was another misreading of history. In the 1930s, 
when governments abandoned the gold standard, international trade 
and lending had already all but collapsed. This time, in contrast, Euro-
pean countries did just enough to avoid that fate. Hence the euro had to 
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The Great Depression and the Great Recession in a Historical Mirror 23 
be defended in order to preserve the single-market and intra-European 
trade and payments. In the 1930s, political solidarity was another early 
casualty of the Depression (Clavin 2010). Notwithstanding the strains 
of the crisis, governments this time continued to consult and collab-
orate. All complaints about the European Union notwithstanding, 60 
years of European integration fostered a degree of political solidarity 
considerably greater than that of the 1930s. EU countries in a strong 
economic and financial position provided loans to their weak European 
partners. Those loans could have been larger, but they were large by the 
standards of the 1930s (Accominotti and Eichengreen, forthcoming). 
Here, then, is another case where the history of the 1930s was an 
imperfect guide to policy outcomes. Where the earlier crisis led to the 
collapse of the gold standard, the recent one has not led to the collapse 
of the eurozone. At least not yet. 
Notes 
This chapter draws on my book Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great 
Recession, and the Uses—and Misuses—of History (Eichengreen 2015a). The informal 
and personal tone of this chapter consciously reflects the lecture format for which it 
was prepared. 
1. There is by now an abundant literature by foreign policy specialists making this 
point. See, for example, Eichengreen (2012), Kyong (1965), Lawrence (2014), 
May (1973), Neustadt and May (1986), and Shinko (1994). 
2. For anticipations of the fact, see Bernanke (2001) and Romer (1992). 
3. On psychological biases in general, there is Kahneman (2011). 
4. That Friedman and Schwartz in particular had said relatively little about the onset 
of the Depression was a subtext of Peter Temin’s influential book (1976). One 
important contribution that did discuss the run-up to the Depression at length was 
that of Temin’s MIT colleague Charles Kindleberger (1973). Another noteworthy 
if only partially successful attempt to develop this aspect of the story is Bernstein 
(1989). 
5. There were rare exceptions, to be sure; see, for example, White (1984). 
6. For an attempt to do so after the fact, see Accomminotti and Eichengreen (2016). 
7. An early recognition of the point as it applies to the recent crisis is Kohn (2009). 
8. See Bernanke (2010) and associated discussion as cited in Pazzanghera (2010). 
See also the discussion in Geithner (2014). 
9. For perspectives on the Lehman Brothers story, see Financial Crisis Inquiry Com-
mission (2011), MacDonald and Robinson (2010), and Sorkin (2010). 
10. For details on this crisis, see Kennedy (1973) and Wicker (1996). 
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24 Eichengreen 
11. This was the emphasis of Friedman and Schwartz’s influential Monetary History 
(1963). 
12. Although it did own an online bank, Lehman Brothers Bank FSB offered com-
munity banking services in Delaware, not that this played a key role in the parent 
institution’s failure. 
13. Former AIG CEO Maurice (“Hank”) Greenberg eventually filed a lawsuit against 
the federal government disputing the terms of the bailout. At the time of writing, 
closing arguments were still pending; see Milford and Zajac (2015). 
14. As described in the chapter of the same title in Brown (2010). 
15. The literature on the impact of these policies is large and characterized by contro-
versy. Among the definitive studies in my view are Feyrer and Sacerdote (2011), 
Joyce et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Mian and Sufi 
(2012), and Pesaran and Smith (2012). 
16. For the current recovery in historical perspective, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2014). 
17. Estimates of such impacts differ, of course. A dispassionate analysis, if there is 
such a thing, is Whalen (2015). The best European equivalent of which I am aware 
is Barrell, Holland, and Hurst (2012). 
18. The literature on fiscal consolidation in Europe is controversial, to put an under-
stated gloss on the point. A meta-analysis of the literature can be found in Gechert, 
Hughes-Hallett, and Rannenberg (2015). 
19. A retrospective analysis with whose conclusions I broadly concur is Rosengren 
(2015). 
20. On Trichet and ECB policy, see Irwin (2015). 
21. See the letter from 24 eminent economists published in the Wall Street Journal 
(2010). 
22. This is another context in which we are now likely to write the history of the 1920s 
differently having lived through our own crisis and discovered how difficult it is 
to track the development of contemporaneous conditions in real time; we are thus 
likely to better appreciate how contemporaries similarly lacked adequate informa-
tion on how quickly the economy was in fact contracting in the final months of 
1929. 
23. A more systematic comparison of financial reform following the two crises is 
Eichengreen (2015b). 
24. A good scholarly analysis is O’Rourke and Taylor (2013). 
25. See, for example, O’Brien (2013). 
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The Great Recession and 
Lessons for Policymaking 
Gary Burtless 
Brookings Institution 
This chapter addresses a straightforward question: What policy les-
sons can we draw from the Great Recession? At the time of this writing 
in late 2014, the lessons have more academic than practical interest 
to policymakers in Washington. Most decision-makers are more con-
cerned about the next election than they are about warnings from an 
experience that is unlikely to soon be repeated. However, examining 
the experience may be useful when considering policies to prevent or 
manage a future downturn. 
The Great Recession produced the worst economic slump since the 
Great Depression. Compared with other post–World War II recessions, 
the one in 2008–2009 was particularly severe and the recovery from it 
unusually sluggish. This is clear from a glance at job market statistics: 
the spike in the unemployment rate—5.5 percentage points between 
the first half of 2007 and October 2009—was the biggest the coun-
try experienced in the postwar era; the persistence of high joblessness 
was uncommonly severe; and the unemployment rate remained above 
8 percent for 43 consecutive months. The only postwar rival in terms 
of severity was the recession during the Reagan administration, which 
began in the summer of 1981. The unemployment rate in the 1980s 
remained above 8 percent for only 27 consecutive months. 
The consequences of the Great Recession for job losers and new job 
entrants were unusually harsh. Over the entire postwar era before the 
Great Recession, the median duration of unemployment reached a peak 
of just 12.3 weeks, which occurred in May 1983 during the recovery 
from the Reagan recession. In the recent slump, the median duration 
of unemployment reached a peak more than twice as high, 25 weeks, 
and it remained above 13 weeks for an astonishing 67 consecutive 
29 
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months. The BLS employment report for November 2014 showed that 
the median unemployment duration for that month fell below 13 weeks 
for the first time since March 2009. 
As painful as it was, however, the Great Recession was not remotely 
as severe as the Great Depression, which was “great” in its depth and 
duration. The peak unemployment rate in the 1930s was 25 percent, 
compared to just 10 percent during and after the Great Recession. 
Between the fall of 1929 and the spring of 1933, the U.S. economy 
shrank for 43 consecutive months, whereas in the recent recession the 
economy shrank for just 18 months. At the end of the 1929–1933 down-
turn, real GDP per person was about 29 percent smaller than it was just 
before the Depression began (Figure 3.1), compared to about 5 percent 
between 2007 and 2009. In the Great Depression, per capita GDP did 
not return to its pre-Depression level until 1937, a span of eight years; it 
Figure 3.1  U.S. Gross Domestic Product per Person in the Great 
Depression and Great Recession 
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SOURCE: Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and 
Product Accounts. 
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took a little less than five years after the Great Recession for per capita 
GDP to surpass its prerecession peak. 
The Great Depression saw personal consumption per person fall 21 
percent below its pre-Depression level. In the worst year of the Depres-
sion, the typical American consumed about one-fifth fewer goods and 
services than in the last pre-Depression year. In the Great Recession, 
per capita real consumption fell just 4 percent. Whatever the shortcom-
ings of macroeconomic policymaking in recent years, the fact is that 
the U.S. economy performed far better between 2007 and 2014 than it 
did in the decade that began in 1929. U.S. macro policies in the recent 
downturn also delivered better results than the ones devised by policy-
makers in most other rich countries. Nonetheless, “It could have been 
worse” is not a winning political slogan, a fact emphatically confirmed 
by U.S. voters in the three elections after the recovery began. “It could 
have been worse” is, however, a fair assessment of fiscal policymak-
ing over the past seven years. The question this chapter poses is, “How 
could it have been better?” 
BACKGROUND 
The federal government did not stand still in the face of the severe 
contraction in late 2008. It dealt promptly with the financial crisis that 
triggered the downturn. In fact, the rescue of ailing financial institutions 
was mostly accomplished within a year after the worst phase of the 
crisis. My critique focuses mostly on fiscal rather than monetary policy. 
Fiscal policy is where U.S. policymakers, as well as those in much of 
the industrialized world, fell furthest below the mark. Still, it is worth 
remembering that an emergency law passed by Congress in October 
2008 and an extraordinary series of steps by the Federal Reserve Board 
(Fed) in 2008 and early 2009 were needed to keep the U.S. financial 
system functioning. 
Monetary Policy 
Already worried by signs of financial market instability, the Fed 
began to cut short-term interest rates in the summer of 2007, when the 
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economy was still growing and the stock market climbing. By May 2008, 
the central bank reduced its policy interest rate from 5.25 percent to 2.0 
percent. On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers, the nation’s fourth-
largest investment bank, declared bankruptcy. The bank’s collapse trig-
gered a worldwide panic and started the worst phase of the financial 
crisis. In response, the Federal Reserve lowered its policy interest rate 
still further. By the end of 2008 the federal funds rate, which is the inter-
est rate banks use to make overnight loans to one another, was cut to its 
lowest level of the modern era. In the 16 months after August 2007, the 
Fed cut its benchmark short-term rate by 5.1 points, to essentially zero. 
The Fed also extended extraordinary credits to both banks and non-
bank institutions in exchange for high-quality collateral. This emer-
gency measure was needed to keep credit flowing in markets where 
ordinary lending had practically ceased. Without this step many solvent 
financial and nonfinancial companies would have been forced to either 
enter bankruptcy or sharply curtail their normal operations. Many firms 
would have been cut off from routine short-term borrowing. By keep-
ing credit flowing in the middle of a panic, the Fed kept the financial 
market crisis from metastasizing into something much worse. The real 
economy took a beating, but if credit markets had completely seized up, 
the damage could have been catastrophic. Providing liquidity in a crisis 
is a classic role of a well-functioning central bank. 
When the Fed pushed its policy interest rate to zero in late 2008, it 
exhausted the standard measures used by central banks to encourage 
borrowing and spur growth. With safe, short-term interest rates close to 
zero, the Fed either had to watch from the sidelines or take unconven-
tional steps to encourage lending and borrowing. One of the main tools 
it used after late 2008 was quantitative easing. This strategy involves 
the Fed’s purchase of longer-term Treasury securities than it ordinar-
ily holds, as well as purchases of private market securities, including
mortgage-backed securities. These purchases can potentially reduce 
market interest rates on intermediate- and longer-term private securi-
ties. Through the fall of 2014 the Fed purchased $1.6 trillion in Treasury 
bonds and $1.7 trillion in mortgage-backed securities in three different 
sequences, all in an effort to push down intermediate- and long-term 
interest rates. 
The logic behind this strategy is that by reducing longer-term inter-
est rates the Fed might encourage some consumers and firms who oth-
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erwise would not have borrowed funds to do so. Their borrowing can in 
turn give a boost to business investment, new home building, and pur-
chases of consumer durable goods, such as cars. Experts on monetary 
policy, consumer spending, and business investment have not reached a 
consensus on whether this policy has worked. What seems clear is that 
the Fed was pushed to adopt unconventional policies because Congress 
failed to adopt a fiscal policy that is appropriate when the economy is 
operating far below its potential and when short-term interest rates on 
safe securities are close to zero. 
Fiscal Policy 
With prodding from two presidents, Congress authorized a series of 
fiscal policy measures to boost consumer incomes, induce businesses to 
expand investment, and protect state-level spending on health, educa-
tion, and public infrastructure. Most of the special government mea-
sures in response to the Great Recession were familiar ones: Tempo-
rary tax reductions to boost consumer incomes and encourage business 
investment; extensions of unemployment benefits and liberalization of 
other government transfer programs, including food stamps and social 
assistance; and increased federal appropriations for new government 
investment in buildings, roads, and science and technology projects. 
The special fiscal measures included some unusual measures as well. 
For the first time, the federal government paid for generous insurance 
subsidies for laid-off workers who lost health insurance when they lost 
their jobs. It also provided unusually liberal grants to state governments 
to encourage them to maintain or increase spending on core state obli-
gations, such as K–12 education and health care for the indigent. Presi-
dent Obama used funds authorized under the Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (TARP) to finance emergency lending and fast-track bankruptcy 
funding to preserve General Motors, Chrysler, and many auto supply 
companies. A small share of emergency stimulus appropriations was 
used to fund or provide loans to projects aimed at improving energy 
efficiency and reducing carbon emissions. 
It should be emphasized that an overwhelming percentage of stimu-
lus dollars was spent on programs that would have been familiar to poli-
cymakers and economists in every recession since the early 1960s. This 
is true whether the administration was Democratic or Republican, liberal 
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or conservative. This is also true whether Congress was controlled by 
Democrats or Republicans, liberals or conservatives. The emphasis and 
overall scale of stimulus programs have differed depending on the polit-
ical leanings of the party in control of Congress and the White House. 
However, Republican and conservative critics of recent fiscal policy are 
kidding themselves (and voters) when they claim to be horrified by the 
actual contents and additions to the deficit connected with the stimulus. 
Republicans were in control of either the White House or Congress (or 
both) in recessions in the mid-1970s, in the early 1980s, in 2001–2003, 
and in 2008. Many elements of the stimulus program adopted in 2009 
and 2010 were also present in the fiscal policies adopted in those reces-
sions—notably, big tax cuts, generous extensions of unemployment 
benefits, and extra outlays on public capital investment. In 2008–2009 
the scale and speed of the additions to peacetime deficits were unprec-
edented, to be sure. But that is because after Lehman Brothers entered 
bankruptcy the nation faced the frightening prospect of financial market 
collapse. Even though the risk was reduced to a manageable level by 
spring 2009, the effects of the financial crisis on the real economy were 
obvious, severe, and still growing well into 2010. 
The fact that most postwar administrations and Congresses would 
have pursued the same or a similar set of stimulus policies has not altered 
a basic reality. The popular political reaction to some of the best-known 
policies has been intensely hostile. In particular, the financial rescue of 
the nation’s biggest banks and automakers inspired widespread public 
indignation. The federal bailout of big banks appeared to reward firms 
whose imprudent, even reckless behavior helped to create the crisis. 
Many voters may have incorrectly believed that an overwhelming share 
of public funds used to restore the economy was spent on bailouts for 
big banks and automakers. In fact, far more resources were devoted to 
temporary tax cuts for middle-income families, emergency relief for 
laid-off workers and their families, and generous grants to state and 
local governments. The confusion is understandable. After Democrats 
gained control of both the White House and Congress in January 2009, 
Republican opponents of fiscal stimulus were unrelenting in their criti-
cism of selected components of the countercyclical program. Many 
liberal Democrats joined Republicans in fiercely criticizing the aid 
extended to big financial institutions. Voters may have wrongly inferred 
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that the controversial parts of the stimulus package consumed an out-
sized share of the program’s cost. 
The extreme and unbending hostility of political opponents to the 
fiscal measures has had practical consequences. First, fierce opposition 
from conservatives, including a handful of fiscally conservative Demo-
crats, deterred the administration from proposing a stimulus package 
that was adequate given the magnitude of the shock to the economy. 
This opposition reduced the size of the stimulus the administration 
could persuade Congress to pass. Second, Republican gains in the 
House of Representatives in the 2010 election led to an unwinding of 
fiscal stimulus long before the economy had recovered from the reces-
sion. This was the single worst error in macroeconomic policymaking 
following the financial crisis in fall 2008. The fact that policymakers in 
other rich countries made even worse errors in both fiscal and monetary 
policy does not excuse the fiscal policy errors of U.S. decision makers. 
For reasons that may seem mysterious to future economic historians, 
members of Congress, opinion leaders, and ultimately voters decided 
that the “crisis” of rising public debt represented a more pressing chal-
lenge to the nation than soaring long-term unemployment and the under-
utilization of U.S. productive capacity. There is no evidence that people 
who buy and sell securities ever shared the view that the United States 
was accumulating an unsustainable debt burden. The government was 
able to sell indexed and unindexed short- and long-term Treasury at 
historically low interest rates throughout the crisis and its aftermath. 
Nonetheless, the fear of rising national debt pushed opinion leaders to 
urge Congress to adopt a more conservative fiscal policy after 2009 
than would have seemed appropriate based on the historical record 
from 1929 to 2007. 
Fortunately, the private economy began to grow again in late 2009, 
and between 2010 and 2014, private sector payrolls grew faster than 
200,000 a month. Unfortunately, the downturn was severe, and the 
growing working-age population needs 75,000 net new jobs every 
month just to keep the unemployment rate from rising. For the past four 
years, public sector spending and hiring have done little to speed the 
pace of recovery. In fact, in the three years through 2013, a drop in pub-
lic employee payrolls offset about 6 percent of the job gains generated 
in the private sector. Reductions in public payrolls and also in govern-
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ment consumption and investment created unnecessary headwinds for 
a weak recovery. 
Sharp Downturn, Weak Recovery 
The labor market effects of the 2008–2009 recession were severe 
compared with those of any other postwar recession. More disturbingly, 
the recovery was unusually slow. It is enlightening to compare the recent 
recession with the one that began in 1981, which was the worst postwar 
downturn before the Great Recession. Figure 3.2 shows the trend in the 
unemployment rate before and after the onset of the two recessions. The 
unemployment rate in each case is measured relative to the rate at the 
business cycle peak as designated by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research.1 The business cycle peak is indicated on the horizontal axis 
by “0” and other months by the number of months before or after the 
business cycle peak. The chart tracks the difference between the unem-
Figure 3.2  Change in Unemployment Rate in Two Postwar Recessions 
1981–1982 recession 2008–2009 recession 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
s 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
−1 
−2 
Business 
cycle peak 
−11 −5 1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 61 67 73 79 
Months before or after business cycle peak 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be 
set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your                               
Customer Service Representative if you have questions about fnding this option.
Job Name: -- /402798t
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Great Recession and Lessons for Policymaking 37 
ployment rate in the indicated month and the rate at the business cycle 
peak. The estimates show unemployment changes in the year before the 
recession began up through the eighty-second month after the previous 
business cycle peak. The 1981–1982 recession initially saw a steeper 
rise in the unemployment rate. Slightly more than a year after the onset 
of the recession, however, the increase in joblessness was greater in 
the Great Recession, and the unemployment rate continued to rise for 
22 months rather than just 16. Crucially, the decline in joblessness has 
been much slower in the most recent business cycle. By the thirty-
fifth month, unemployment was back to its prerecession level in the 
1981–1982 downturn but was still 4.8 percentage points higher than the 
prerecession level in the Great Recession. By the eighty-second month 
after the beginning of the Great Recession, unemployment was still 0.8 
percentage points higher than it was when the recession began. At the 
comparable point after the Reagan recession, the jobless rate was 1.6 
points below where it was when the recession began. 
Figure 3.3 shows the same kind of comparison for the decline 
and recovery of payroll employment in the two recessions. The drop 
in employment was initially more severe in the 1981–1982 recession, 
but by the thirteenth month after the downturn began the percentage 
drop in payroll employment was greater in the Great Recession. In the 
eighteenth month after the onset of the 1981–1982 recession, employ-
ment began to recover. Employment did not begin to climb in the Great 
Recession until the twenty-eighth month after the business cycle peak 
in late 2007. By the eighty-second month after the beginning of the 
recession, payroll employment in the 1981–1982 recession was 14.6 
percent above its prerecession peak. In the same month of the most 
recent business cycle, employment was only 0.8 percentage points 
above its prerecession peak. Not only were the labor market effects of 
the recent recession deeper than those of any other postwar recession, 
they have also lingered much longer. 
Why Was the Recovery So Weak? 
The key event that triggered the steep slide in the 2008 economy 
was the near-death experience of the biggest U.S. financial institutions. 
Their brush with disaster interrupted normal credit flows and, more to 
the point, made credit-worthy households and businesses worry about 
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Figure 3.3  Change in Total Payroll Employment in Two  
Postwar Recessions 
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their future access to credit. Investors and businesses fled riskier assets 
and bid up the prices of the safest assets, particularly U.S. government 
debt. 
The underlying cause of financial institutions’ weakness can be 
traced to the run-up in house and apartment prices followed by the steep 
slide in many parts of the country. The rise in prices encouraged house-
holds to borrow and increase their consumption more than they would 
have done based on their incomes alone. The accelerating decline in 
house prices after 2006 wiped out much or all of this extra wealth and 
simultaneously destroyed the credit-worthiness of a large percentage 
of households. Between 2007 and 2009 the combined effects of declin-
ing real estate and stock market prices erased $19 trillion of household 
wealth—one-quarter of household net worth at the peak. This drop in 
wealth would be expected to reduce household consumption by $450 
billion a year if we assume, conservatively, that households boost 
annual consumption by $4 for every $100 increase in their net worth. 
SOURCE: Federal Housing Finance Agency and U.S. Department of Commerce, 
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Figure 3.4  Index of Real U.S. House Prices, 1975–2014, Q1
NOTE: Federal Housing Finance Agency index of U.S.-average house price is deflated 
using the GDP deflator.
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If many consumers spend an even larger percentage of their net gains 
from house price gains, the combined drop in house and stock prices 
would reduce consumer spending by $750 billion per year.2 
Figure 3.4 shows the rise and subsequent fall in home prices com-
pared with all other prices in the U.S. economy. Between the late 1990s 
and 2006, house prices increased by half relative to other prices; by 
2012 they lost about six-tenths of that gain. Between 2006 and the end 
of 2012, they fell one-quarter. Since many homeowners had borrowed 
heavily either to buy their homes or to convert their capital gains into 
ready spending money, a large percentage of them ended up with nega-
tive equity in their homes. If they also saw their incomes drop as a result 
of a bad job market, they simultaneously faced the risk of losing pos-
session of their homes. 
The surge in house prices between 2003 and 2006 was accompanied 
by a strong rise in stock prices. Appreciating stock values helped boost 
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consumption among households that owned equities. When equity 
owners lost faith in U.S. financial institutions and then in the companies 
that depended on them, stock prices plunged. Equity prices fell about 
half between the fall of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009. The collapse 
of stock prices affected the net worth of a different group of households 
than those suffering sharp losses as a result of the housing collapse. 
Stockholders tend to be considerably richer on average than the typical 
homeowner. Nonetheless, wealthy Americans also consume, and their 
consumption is affected by the value of their wealth holdings. 
The best summary measure of American’s wealth holdings is the 
ratio of their household net worth to their disposable income. This ratio 
reached a peak of 6.5-to-1 in 2006 and then fell back to 5-to-1 in early 
2009 (Figure 3.5). The deflation of the house price bubble, the loss of 
confidence in major financial institutions, and collapsing stock mar-
ket valuations erased one-quarter of net household wealth. After 2007 
consumption was no longer being turbo-charged by soaring household 
wealth; it was being pushed down by the drop in household net worth. 
Most large nonfinancial businesses entered the recession with rea-
sonably strong balance sheets. Except for short-term borrowing needs, 
many of them did not have a pressing need for credit to maintain their 
operations. But to persuade a business to invest, the business owner must 
also be persuaded that there will be a market for the added output that 
would be produced by new investment. Business managers and owners 
read the same news stories as the rest of us—after Lehman Brothers’
collapse, they faced the chilling prospect of consumer retrenchment. 
The drop in home prices extinguished many families’ chances for 
added borrowing. But even families with ample wealth faced the reality 
that not only was their net worth no longer rising, it was sinking fast. 
In this environment, households consumed less, businesses sold less, 
and sensible business managers anticipated that household spending 
would remain low, erasing the potential payoff from new investment. 
If a firm is already operating at 30 percent below capacity, why spend 
funds to expand that capacity? Even with short- and intermediate-term 
interest rates at historical lows, the attractions of additional investment 
appeared meager. 
The outlook improved when stock prices recovered and home prices 
began to rise again. Even so, the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer 
Finances suggests that average household net worth for middle- and 
the United States. 
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Figure 3.5  Ratio of Net Household Wealth to Household Disposable 
Income, 1974–2014, Q2
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Accounts of 
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lower-income families was lower in late 2014 than it was in the late 
1980s.3 The top wealth holders are undoubtedly much better off today 
than they were in the aftermath of the Great Recession, but the same 
is not true of lower-income households whose 2007 wealth consisted 
mainly of the equity in their homes. 
The dismal employment numbers I cite above, combined with 
appalling wealth losses, may lead some readers to wonder why per 
capita consumption fell “only” 4 percent from its peak prerecession 
level to its low point in the Great Recession. One answer is that the 
U.S. social safety net worked very well in the Great Recession. When 
we entered the recession, neither the Congress nor the president was 
interested in dismantling the safety net. In fact, President Obama and 
the 2009–2010 Congress enacted important and permanent additions 
to the safety net. Furthermore, Congress and two administrations acted 
promptly to shore up consumer incomes through a range of temporary 
tax cuts and enhancements of the safety net. 
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Even if policymakers do not act to boost the economy in a reces-
sion, the nation’s permanent tax and transfer system has built-in stabi-
lizers that automatically lessen the income losses suffered by the unem-
ployed. Quantitatively, the biggest single item is federal tax payments, 
especially payroll and personal and corporate income taxes, which 
tend to fall faster than private incomes when recessions cause pretax 
incomes to shrink. 
The second-biggest item is unemployment benefits. Experienced 
workers who lose their jobs through no fault of their own ordinarily 
qualify for up to six months of Unemployment Insurance benefits. In 
recessions, benefits can last longer depending on the severity of unem-
ployment in a job loser’s state of residence. Although U.S. unem-
ployment benefits are low compared to those available in most other 
wealthy countries, workers earning the average wage typically qualify 
for benefits that compensate them for half the loss of their prelayoff 
earnings.4 Because the number of laid-off workers qualifying for bene-
fits rises steeply in a recession, the money spent on jobless benefits also 
increases sharply. In every recession since the late 1950s, Congress has 
authorized temporary emergency extensions of unemployment benefits, 
financed with federal funds. It did so again in 2008 and 2009, increasing 
the maximum duration of unemployment benefits to 99 weeks in states 
with the highest unemployment rates. In no previous recession had 
Congress authorized such a lengthy extension of benefits. In addition, 
Congress financed a temporary increase in weekly unemployment ben-
efit checks, and it reduced the income tax levied on benefits. Between 
2007 and 2010, annual outlays on unemployment benefits increased 
more than 4.5 times, rising from $35 billion to $160 billion. 
In addition to temporary improvements in unemployment ben-
efits, the federal government also authorized increases in monthly food 
stamp allotments, extra funding for state governments’ social assistance 
programs for children, and a doubling of the prerecession budget for 
training the unemployed and hard-to-employ. Congress also enacted 
temporary measures to cut household payroll and income tax payments. 
For example, it increased the Earned Income and Child Tax Credits, 
and it authorized a temporary payroll tax credit of $400 per worker and 
$800 per couple in 2009 and 2010, with the credit phased out for upper 
income families. When the temporary tax cuts ended in 2011, they were 
replaced by a temporary cut in the Social Security payroll tax of 2 per-
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The Great Recession and Lessons for Policymaking 43 
centage points. Many low- and moderate-income families do not owe 
income or payroll taxes, and consequently did not benefit under these 
provisions. For some of these families—in particular, those receiving 
Social Security and veterans’ benefits—the 2009 stimulus bill granted 
one-time payments in lieu of the tax cuts. 
Automatic income stabilization combined with generous temporary 
measures to shore up household income achieved their intended aim: 
Household net income fell proportionately far less than the drop in pri-
vate income. This is illustrated in Figure 3.6, which shows the 2007– 
2014 trends in gross market income and disposable personal income. 
Trends in both income series are measured on a per capita basis as a 
percentage of estimated incomes in the fourth quarter of 2007, the last 
calendar quarter of the economic expansion that ended in 2007. Incomes 
in each period are converted into constant purchasing power units using 
the personal consumption expenditure deflator. The line in the chart 
Figure 3.6  Impact of the Great Recession on Pretax Market Income and 
Disposable Income, 2007Q1–2014Q3 
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44 Burtless 
shows the trend in pretax market income per person. Market income 
consists of gross labor compensation to employees, self-employment 
income of business owners, interest, dividends, rental payments, and 
other flows of pretax capital income. Per capita market income fell 
sharply in the recession, declining 8.8 percent by the first quarter of 
2010. Spendable income, indicated by the bars in Figure 3.6, fell pro-
portionately much less. Increases in government transfers and reduced 
personal taxes cushioned households’ income loss. In the period with 
the worst income loss, the first quarter of 2010, disposable income per 
person was only 1.5 percent below its level at the end of the previous 
expansion. 
Figure 3.7 compares the trend in pretax market income with changes 
in the level of government transfers per person. The bars in the chart 
show the level of real government transfers per person, measured as 
a percentage of transfers per person in the final quarter of 2007. Note 
Figure 3.7  Trends in Pretax Market Income and Government Transfer
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The Great Recession and Lessons for Policymaking 45 
the steep increase in transfers starting as early as the second quarter 
of 2008, when the Bush administration and Congress enacted the first 
countercyclical stimulus program. By the second quarter of 2009, 
transfer payments per person were 20 percent higher than in the quarter 
before the recession began. 
Now consider all three components of disposable personal income, 
shown in Figure 3.8: 1) pretax market income (wages, fringe benefits, 
self-employment earnings, rent, interest, and dividends); 2) direct tax 
payments to the government (mainly social insurance and personal 
income tax payments); and 3) transfer payments received from the 
government. Measuring each of these variables relative to their levels 
in the last quarter of 2007, the trend lines in the chart show how per 
capita amounts changed over the period from 2007 through 2014:Q3. 
As a result of progressive income taxation and the temporary tax cuts 
effective over the period 2008–2012, personal tax payments fell, both 
Figure 3.8  Components of Real Disposable Personal Income per Person, 
2007Q1–2014Q3 
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46 Burtless 
absolutely and as a percentage of households’ pretax incomes. By the 
third quarter of 2009, per capita tax payments fell almost 20 percent, 
about twice the proportional drop in pretax market income. The tem-
porary tax cuts were phased out at the end of 2012, so the trend in 
tax payments after that year mirrors the trend in pretax market income. 
As noted above, the increase in real government transfers per person 
has not yet been phased out. Transfer payments continue to supplement 
family incomes more than they did before the Great Recession. 
In view of the sharp increase in transfer income and the sizable tem-
porary cuts in personal taxes, it should not be surprising that personal 
consumption fell much less than market income in the Great Recession, 
a pattern highlighted in Figure 3.9. The line in the figure traces the 
trend in pretax market income per person. Note that per capita market 
income fell nearly 9 percent between 2007 and the first quarter of 2010. 
The bars in the chart show the trend in real consumption expenditures 
per person, measured as a percent of the personal consumption level 
in the last quarter before the recession. Even at the worst point in the 
recession, the second quarter of 2009, personal consumption fell just 
4 percent—a larger drop than the one we observed in per capita dis-
posable income (see Figure 3.6). It is, however, far smaller than the 
drop in pretax market income. The stimulus program combined with 
automatic stabilizers undoubtedly worked in the sense that they dra-
matically reduced the decline in spendable incomes. By helping to hold 
up spendable income, they also lessened the drop in consumer expendi-
tures. Recall that household net worth fell one-quarter while household 
market incomes fell one-eleventh. It represents a considerable achieve-
ment that per capita, real consumption fell only 4 percent below its 
previous peak in the worst quarter of the Great Recession. 
The changes in tax burdens and in government transfers tended to 
favor low- and middle-income families, especially those with a laid-off 
worker, over families with higher incomes. The Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) publishes periodic analyses of the distribution of federal 
tax burdens (e.g., CBO [2014]). The analyses distinguish three defini-
tions of income: gross market incomes (including capital gains and an 
imputation to households of the undistributed income of corporations in 
which they have ownership share); pretax income (gross market income 
plus government transfers); and after-tax income (pretax income minus 
federal taxes, including payroll, income, and excise taxes). The most 
SOURCE: Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and 
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Figure 3.9  Trends in Pretax Market Income and Personal Consumption 
Expenditures per Person, 2007Q1–2014Q3 
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recent published CBO data cover the period from 1979 through 2011, 
and they permit us to determine how incomes under these three defini-
tions differ across the household income distribution and over time. 
CBO’s results for the period 2007–2011 permit us to see how gross 
market income and after-tax income (including government transfers) 
changed in different positions of the income distribution. Figure 3.10 
shows the 2007–2011 change in pretax market income and after-tax 
income across the distribution. Households are ranked by the CBO 
based on their pretax market plus transfer income. Panel A shows per-
cent changes in pretax market incomes; Panel B shows percent changes 
in after-tax incomes. Results on the left show income changes in the 
bottom four-fifths of the income distribution; results on the right show 
changes in the top fifth of the distribution. The latter results are sub-
divided into results for the 81st–90th income percentile, the 91st–95th 
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48 Burtless 
Figure 3.10  Estimates of Changes in Market Income and Posttax, 
Posttransfer Income by Position in Household Income 
Distribution, 2007–2011 
Panel A: Percent change in market income 
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tion contains an equal number of people. 
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The Great Recession and Lessons for Policymaking 49 
percentile, the 96th–99th percentile, and the top 1 percent of pretax 
income recipients. 
The biggest income losses were sustained by households in the top 
1 percent of the income distribution. Those households saw a 27 per-
cent drop in both their pre- and posttax incomes. In all other income 
groups the proportional drop in posttax, posttransfer income was sub-
stantially smaller than the drop in gross market income. Lower taxes 
and higher transfer payments erased all the market income losses suf-
fered by households in the bottom two-fifths of the income distribu-
tion. According to CBO’s estimates, households in the bottom one-fifth 
of the income distribution saw a small rise in their after-tax incomes 
even though they suffered an 8 percent drop in their average market 
incomes. (The CBO estimates show, however, that households in the 
bottom income group derive a large share of their total income from 
public transfers.) Middle- and lower-middle-income households saw 
large declines in their pretax market incomes, but when tax reductions 
and increased government transfers are taken into account, the percent-
age loss in net income was far smaller. Only near the top of the income 
distribution did households experience proportional losses in their 
after-tax incomes that were comparable to the reductions in their mar-
ket incomes. The CBO income analysis thus confirms a little-known 
fact: The nation’s social safety net as well as the special fiscal measures 
enacted early in the Great Recession offset a sizable fraction of the 
market income losses suffered by Americans in the bottom 95 percent 
of the income distribution. Even though many voters appear to have 
missed this beneficent effect of the stimulus program, the reduction in 
spendable income losses represents a signal achievement of U.S. fiscal 
policy in the Great Recession. 
HOW DID FISCAL POLICY FAIL? 
If fiscal policy succeeded in offsetting much of the market income 
loss suffered by lower- and middle-income Americans, it nonetheless 
failed to create buoyant demand for goods and services produced in 
the United States. This failure is almost certainly connected to the fact 
that, even in the winter of 2009, few policymakers or public or pri-
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vate forecasters anticipated the severity of the Great Recession. The 
United States had experienced severe recessions in the earlier postwar 
period—notably in 1974–1976 and 1980–1983—and it had seen weak 
recoveries after both the 1990 and 2001 recessions. But never before 
in the postwar period did the nation experience a severe recession fol-
lowed by a painfully slow recovery. The Great Recession combined 
these two elements. Even in winter 2009, forecasters in the private sec-
tor, the CBO, the Federal Reserve, and the new Obama administration 
substantially underestimated the severity of the recession.5 Their pre-
diction errors were understandable—after all, they were based on the 
experience of other recessions in the postwar era. 
The forecasting errors had unfortunate consequences. Because the 
reality turned out to be considerably worse than the forecast, naïve or 
unscrupulous critics tended to blame the disappointing outcome on the 
policies adopted by Congress and the Obama administration. As crit-
ics correctly pointed out, the actual trend in both output and employ-
ment turned out worse than the administration forecast. But rather than 
draw the correct inference—the downturn was worse than forecasters 
believed based on preliminary and incomplete statistics—critics of U.S. 
policy reached the profoundly wrong conclusion that countercyclical 
fiscal and monetary policy produced the disappointing shortfall. 
Prudent policymakers, even if they accepted the consensus forecast, 
should have formulated a Plan B. They should have asked, “Suppose 
the outcome is much worse than we expect? Suppose unemployment 
rises more than forecast and payrolls rebound more slowly?” Under 
those circumstances, we should have expected long-term unemploy-
ment to increase substantially. Past experience shows that employers 
are reluctant to hire the long-term unemployed as long as there are 
plenty of short-term unemployed and new job seekers in the applicant 
queue. What policies would help deal with the swelling number of long-
term unemployed? I do not think influential policymakers ever devised 
a Plan B. Once it was clear in summer 2009 that the financial system 
was on the road to recovery, the sense of crisis passed. 
Some economists in the administration and many more who were 
advising Republican presidential aspirants and members of Congress 
turned to the task of trimming the deficit. They thought the crisis was 
over. For the growing number of long-term unemployed and the mil-
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be 
set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your                               
Customer Service Representative if you have questions about fnding this option.
Job Name: -- /402798t
 
 
The Great Recession and Lessons for Policymaking 51 
lions who would eventually join their ranks, a weak job market was or 
would become the central problem of their economic lives. 
The simple explanation for stubbornly high unemployment was 
that there was too little aggregate demand for goods and services pro-
duced in the United States. The drop in overall demand due to shrunken 
household wealth, the sharp fall-off in the demand for new homes, and 
weaker business demand for new investment caused labor demand 
to fall far below the level needed to produce full employment. Using 
conventional monetary policy tools, there was little the Fed could do 
to boost demand once interest rates on safe short-term securities fell 
almost to zero. The usual policy remedy when the nation has exhausted 
standard monetary policy tools is to use fiscal policy to lift overall 
demand. The U.S. government boosted fiscal stimulus in 2008–2010 
and then began to reduce that stimulus though the unemployment rate 
remained above 8 percent through August 2012. 
Ingredients of Plan B 
A more sensible policy would have aimed at boosting the demand 
for jobless workers well past the date when Congress began cutting the 
fiscal stimulus. Since voters and lawmakers were concerned about addi-
tions to the national debt, fiscal policy should have focused on reducing 
the country’s underemployment problem. This means that every $100 
added to the national debt to finance the plan should have increased by 
at least $100 the amount employers spent on wages and fringe benefits 
of workers residing in this country. Boosting transfer payments to per-
sons and cutting business and consumer taxes are not the most reliable 
ways to maximize the impact of additional public spending on labor 
compensation. 
Consumers whose disposable incomes are increased by a tax cut 
may spend their extra incomes on goods produced in another country, 
they may reduce their indebtedness, or they may increase their bank 
balances. If financial institutions are unwilling to lend out the extra 
deposits for current consumption or investment, the additional $100 in 
federal debt accumulated to provide the tax cut will not yield an addi-
tional $100 of outlays on wages. 
The same is true of tax cuts or benefit hikes that consumers use 
to buy products produced in China, Thailand, or Germany. When we 
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52 Burtless 
implement an emergency Plan B, it is with the understanding that we 
are trying to extricate the U.S. economy from a serious domestic crisis. 
We want the additions to debt to deal first and foremost with our domes-
tic economic problem rather than the ones faced by the Chinese, Thai, 
or German governments. After 2009, voters and members of Congress 
became worried about the soaring national debt (wrongly, in my view). 
If we want to economize on the additions to the national debt while 
at the same time dealing with the shortfall in U.S. aggregate demand, 
we should adopt emergency policies that maximize the employment 
effect of each additional dollar of debt needed to deal with the shortfall. 
Added debt-financed spending should reduce the number of involun-
tarily unemployed Americans as much as possible. When there is per-
sistent excess unemployment and widespread fear of taking on added 
debt, we want any additions to our debt to produce added labor income 
for workers in the United States rather than in other countries. 
What policies could have achieved this goal? Investing in addi-
tional new or refurbished public infrastructure seems like a promising 
way to boost demand for U.S. workers. Both construction and durable 
manufacturing were badly hurt by the downturn. Payroll employment 
during the recession fell more than 20 percent in durable goods manu-
facturing and nearly 30 percent in the construction industry. Both indus-
tries were in fact already shrinking when the Great Recession began. 
Skilled and unskilled workers in these industries could have been put to 
work on useful public projects without depriving the private sector of 
workers whose talents were in short supply. Private sector demand for 
these workers was inadequate in 2009–2013 and remained inadequate 
through 2014. 
A federal policy of funding public infrastructure could only be 
effective in reducing joblessness if employers added net new jobs that 
otherwise would not have been created. A sizable share of public infra-
structure is financed, built, or maintained by state and local govern-
ments. If the federal government provides $100 billion to state gov-
ernments for new infrastructure investment, it should place restrictions 
on the grants so states do not subtract $100 billion from infrastructure 
investment they otherwise would have paid for themselves. Ensur-
ing that grantees do not offset the intended effects of grants by under-
taking less self-financed activity of the kind subsidized by the grants is 
a well-known problem in public finance. How can the national govern-
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be 
set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your                               
Customer Service Representative if you have questions about fnding this option.
Job Name: -- /402798t
  
 
 
The Great Recession and Lessons for Policymaking 53 
ment create incentives for state and local lawmakers to undertake new 
activities on their own with their own resources? Some methods have 
proven more effective than others. The federal government can place a 
floor on states’ and localities’ own spending on the activity it is trying 
to encourage. That floor can be linked to the prerecession level of state 
and local spending on the activity. States can then be penalized with 
reduced federal grant payments if state and local government outlays on 
the activity drops beneath the specified floor. This method of incentiv-
izing state lawmakers is particularly effective if the increase in federal 
aid is expected to be temporary. Congress can also establish drop-dead 
dates for the expenditure of emergency federal aid. For example, Con-
gress could have required that federal aid appropriated and authorized 
in 2009 must be spent no later than December 2013. Unexpended funds 
would then be returned to the Treasury, which could redistribute the 
funds to states that spent their stimulus grants on the designated activity 
and on schedule. 
Most voters may have been under the impression that, aside from 
bank bailouts, the bulk of stimulus spending was devoted to infrastruc-
ture investment and maintenance projects. That is not the case. Consider 
the programs authorized by Congress in February 2009 as part of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Figure 3.11 pres-
ents a three-way breakdown of the fund allocations. The bottom portion 
of each bar shows the funds authorized for public infrastructure projects 
or grants and tax incentives for businesses and nonprofit organizations 
to invest in buildings and research and development. The appropriated 
funds are divided into two time periods, fiscal years 2009–2010 and 
2011–2019. An overwhelming share of the total funds were expected 
to be spent in 2009–2010, that is, before October 2010. This is not the 
case, however, for the funds slated for infrastructure and R&D invest-
ments. Most of those capital expenditures were expected to be spent 
after 2010. These capital expenditures may be what many voters have 
in mind when they refer to “stimulus spending.” In fact, such spending 
was a minor part of the stimulus. The overwhelming share of stimu-
lus funds were spent on temporary tax cuts and transfers to persons. 
The share devoted to those items is indicated in the middle portion of 
the bars. Actually, the chart understates the fraction of stimulus dollars 
devoted to tax cuts and transfer benefit increases because it excludes 
the sizable tax cuts and benefit improvements authorized in the last year 
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Figure 3.11  Anticipated Stimulus Spending under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 2009–2019 
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of the Bush administration and in the months after February 2009. It 
ignores all stimulus funds except those that were authorized under the 
ARRA program. Virtually all of the non-ARRA stimulus spending took 
the form of tax cuts and unemployment benefit expansions. 
Why was so little money devoted to public capital projects, even 
though these have powerful advantages in ensuring that funds are used 
to buy goods and services produced in the United States? When the 
stimulus program was authorized, the Obama administration and well- 
informed members of Congress recognized they wanted the money to 
be spent quickly, when the slump was actually in progress. Informed 
policymakers were also aware of the difficulties of spending funds 
quickly when the money is allocated to new or refurbished public capi-
tal projects. It is hard to come up with a controversy-free list of projects 
on which to spend extra federal dollars. Even after a list of projects is 
chosen, it may take many months or even years before the resources 
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can be invested to complete the projects. States and local governments 
may game the federal rules so they obtain fiscal relief with federal aid 
rather than add to the number of worthwhile projects they undertake or 
complete. 
Delays in selecting and beginning capital projects will delay the 
expenditure of capital project funds. Federal stimulus dollars may not 
actually get spent until the economic emergency is past, at which point 
the federal dollars will compete with private-sector dollars to obtain the 
resources needed to complete the long-delayed projects. Skilled work-
ers, expensive machinery, and experienced managers may be in short 
supply when the federal aid dollars are finally spent. Instead of boosting 
aggregate demand when the economy is far below full employment, 
the funds may get spent when the economy is near full employment. In 
short, funds will be spent too late to speed the recovery and just in time 
to fuel inflation in a fully employed economy. In contrast, tax cuts and 
transfer increases can be temporary and targeted on population groups 
in greatest need of aid. 
These are valid lessons from the nation’s post–World War II expe-
rience with countercyclical public works programs. They represent 
costly and hard-won lessons, but they do not apply with much force 
when policymakers are looking for a Plan B, a strategy that will reduce 
excess unemployment when short-term interest rates are at or near zero. 
In those circumstances, monetary policy will be less effective in bring-
ing the economy closer to full employment. When the shortfall from 
full employment is expected to last a long time, the advantages of a 
temporary public works program seem compelling. Even if state and 
local governments cannot immediately find or begin new shovel-ready 
projects, they should be capable of finding and beginning them within a 
couple of years. The limitations mentioned above might mean few dol-
lars would have been spent on public capital projects in 2008 or 2009. As 
it turned out, however, the U.S. job market still needed a sizable boost 
in 2010—and in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. The majority of states and 
thousands of local governments could have found worthwhile capital 
projects on which to spend emergency federal aid dollars over such a 
lengthy span of years. The risk that such a capital investment program 
would have generated excess inflation now seems far-fetched, but even 
if we assume that states only began spending their emergency public 
works money when the recovery was nearly complete, policymakers 
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56 Burtless 
can use many policy tools to reduce excess inflation. For example, the 
Fed could raise short-term interest rates, or Congress could raise tax 
rates or curb public spending on other discretionary budget items. 
The third main budget category in the 2009 ARRA package was an 
allocation to aid state and local governments. Those funds are indicated 
by the top portion of the columns in Figure 3.11. The amount of money 
allocated to state aid in 2009–2010 was twice the level allocated to 
government capital projects and in research and development invest-
ment. Federal policymakers were worried in 2009 that a sharp decline 
in state and local revenues would push local lawmakers to cut benefits 
to the unemployed, trim health and education spending, and shrink pub-
lic payrolls. The temporary fiscal relief from the federal government 
was large enough to offset a quarter to a third of the expected state and 
local budget imbalances that resulted from the recession. It is an open 
question whether this aid to state and local governments was effective 
in reducing employment losses in the downturn or in speeding growth 
in the recovery. Years of careful research will be needed to determine 
how states and localities spent the extra federal funds they received. 
State and local public employee payrolls increased modestly through 
the middle of 2010, and it seems likely these payroll gains would have 
been smaller in the absence of the temporary federal aid. State and local 
payrolls began to fall in 2010 at the same time private-sector employ-
ment began to recover. Public payrolls then continued to slide through 
the end of 2013, offsetting about one-seventh of the employment gains 
generated by private employers. 
Figure 3.12 divides the ARRA stimulus package into the same three 
categories described in Figure 3.11 and shows the timing of spending 
on each item measured as a percentage of potential GDP in the indi-
cated fiscal year. Total spending on the package was estimated to be 
$835 billion spread over 10 years. Outlays were expected to peak in fis-
cal year 2010 and then slide steeply immediately thereafter. However, 
Congress later authorized further extensions in unemployment benefits 
and sizable (though shrinking) tax cuts after the expiration of those 
authorized in ARRA. Nearly all the later stimulus packages either cut 
Americans’ taxes (income taxes and Social Security payroll taxes) or 
provided more generous unemployment benefits than are offered under 
regular state programs. Congress failed to authorize any more capital 
projects or additional fiscal relief for state and local governments. A
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 2009–2015 
SOURCE: Author s tabulations of data from Congressional Budget Office (2009). 
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Figure 3.12  Anticipated Stimulus Spending under the American 
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visual adjustment in Figure 3.12 to reflect all the stimulus programs 
through 2014 rather than just the spending authorized under ARRA
would show much higher funding in FYs 2011–2013 for direct income 
assistance, provided largely in the form of tax cuts and unemployment 
benefit increases. 
The composition of spending authorized under the stimulus pack-
ages makes public hostility to the spending puzzling. In January 2010, 
CNN conducted a poll asking Americans about their views of the 
stimulus program passed less than a year earlier (CNN 2010). The poll 
results showed that about 75 percent of Americans thought at least half 
of the stimulus dollars were “wasted” and 45 percent thought “most” or 
“nearly all” of the stimulus dollars had been wasted. When one consid-
ers how the stimulus outlays were allocated, this view seems extremely 
odd. Most of the stimulus dollars were spent directly on them, that is,
the poll respondents themselves. By far the biggest slice of stimulus 
outlays was devoted to personal income tax cuts (lower tax withhold-
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58 Burtless 
ings or bigger refund checks). Lower direct taxes boosted after-tax 
incomes for at least 80 percent of American households. Other portions 
of the package funded extensions in unemployment benefits, hikes in 
food stamps, and a variety of tax credits for low-income wage earners 
or families rearing children. If these stimulus dollars were wasted, most 
of the waste was being done by the poll respondents themselves. 
Another slice of stimulus spending, at least in 2009 and 2010, went 
to grants in aid for state spending on education and Medicaid. It is likely 
that only part of this aid was used by states to increase or maintain their 
spending on education and health benefits. A large portion was probably 
used for general budgetary support and indirectly to help states avoid 
imposing tax hikes. If polling respondents were correct and “more than 
half” or “nearly all” of these stimulus dollars were wasted, the blame 
lies not with Congress or the president but with state and local law-
makers and governors, who were provided with an additional $130 bil-
lion in federal aid with which they could maintain state and local spend-
ing or delay tax increases on local residents. 
Since voters rarely object to tax reductions or transfer increases that 
directly benefit themselves, I suspect many poll respondents believed— 
erroneously—that most stimulus spending was used to pay for unpop-
ular bank and automaker bailouts, wasteful public works projects, or 
generously subsidized loans to politically connected businesses. The 
fact that very little stimulus money was spent in this way was probably 
known to only a small minority of voters. 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT 
Many Americans may be under the impression that the federal 
government is still spending large amounts of money on what is popu-
larly referred to as stimulus. Aside from very modest extra spending 
on transfer payments, this is not the case. Spending on public invest-
ment—roads, bridges, school and college buildings, ports, medical labs, 
and sewer systems—is done at the state and local level. The federal 
government is primarily responsible for investment in defense. Figure 
3.13 shows the trend in real spending on state and local government 
investment in the two worst recessions of the postwar era. The solid 
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Figure 3.13  State and Local Government Investment in Two  
Postwar Recessions 
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line shows the trend in real state and local spending on public invest-
ment during and after the recession of the early 1980s, and the dashed 
line shows the same trend during and after the Great Recession. In the 
recent recession, state spending on public investment projects held 
up well when federal stimulus dollars were directly supporting state 
budgets, but state and local investment began to shrink starting in the 
seventh quarter after the onset of the recession. State and local invest-
ment spending has recently been one-fifth below its prerecession level. 
In contrast, it shrank about 5 percent during the recession in the early 
1980s but then began to recover. Six years after the start of the reces-
sion, state and local investment spending was one-third higher than it 
was prior. 
Statistics on total government outlays on final consumption and 
investment are equally depressing. Figure 3.14 shows the trend in this 
form of public spending at all levels of government—federal, state, 
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Figure 3.14  Total Government Final Consumption and Gross Investment 
in Two Postwar Recessions 
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and local. This spending includes not only national defense and non-
defense investment, but also the compensation payments to government 
employees and contractors. The solid line in the chart shows the trend 
in spending in the recession of the 1980s. Even though the national 
government in that era was politically conservative, real spending rose 
steadily and substantially during and after the economic downturn. In 
the Great Recession, the stimulus packages initially pushed up govern-
ment consumption and investment outlays, but by the tenth quarter after 
the onset of the recession, spending already began to decline. By the 
nineteenth quarter after the recession began, government consumption 
and investment was 2 percent below its prerecession level. At the same 
point in the recovery from the 1980s recession, real spending was 27 
percent higher than it was before the recession began. During the Great 
Recession, shrinking government budgets during the recovery tended 
to depress overall demand; during the 1980s recession, steady increases 
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in government spending throughout the recovery boosted aggregate 
demand. Even though unemployment remained high and utilization of 
the capital stock low, policymakers began to shrink public consumption 
and investment soon after 2009. By 2013 real government spending on 
these items was smaller than it was when the recession began. 
Starting in 2010 advocates of government austerity may have 
believed it was prudent to refrain from borrowing additional funds 
because savers inside and outside the United States were growing fright-
ened of the nation’s mounting public debt. Some stimulus critics feared 
that current and future U.S. taxpayers would have to pay extraordinarily 
high interest rates to borrow the funds needed to finance public budgets. 
This fear seems nonsensical in view of the interest rates actually paid on 
U.S. government debt. One indicator of the burden future taxpayers will 
have to pay is the real interest rate savers demand in order to hold U.S. 
Treasury securities. The world’s savers do not demand that the United 
States pay much interest on its public debt. Figure 3.15 shows the trend 
in real interest rates on five-year and long-duration indexed U.S. Trea-
sury securities. For most of the 2011–2014 period, the five-year indexed 
bond offered a yield of less than 0 percent. Savers offered to lend the 
federal government funds for five years and receive interest payments 
that did not even compensate them for the change in the price level. The 
chart also displays the trend in real yields on long-duration inflation-
indexed Treasury securities.6 In the first four years after the financial 
crisis the yield on these long-duration securities fell from 2.5 percent to 
0.0 percent. In the last quarter of 2012 savers in effect offered to hold 
federal debt without receiving any real compensation at all. Based on 
the evidence in Figure 3.15, it is hard to see any evidence that savers 
were losing confidence in the government’s ability to repay its debt. 
If the government can find investment projects that are expected to 
yield benefits that exceed 1 or 2 percent a year over the next 15–20 years, 
it would be worthwhile to invest in those projects. Savers were offering 
(and continue to offer) the federal government funds at historically low 
interest rates at the same time the nation had millions of unemployed 
workers and a sizable amount of unused productive capacity. 
It is hard to believe the country cannot identify infrastructure 
projects with payoffs that are expected to yield 1 or 2 percent a year. 
According to the World Economic Forum’s most recent Global Com-
petitiveness Report (Schwab 2013), infrastructure in the United States 
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Figure 3.15  Real Yields on U.S. Treasury Inflation-Indexed Securities, 
2003–2014 
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ranks fifteenth among the countries graded. This is a somewhat higher 
rank than Austria and a lower rank than Korea and Taiwan. Each of the 
other countries has substantially lower average incomes than the United 
States, so one might expect the United States to have substantially bet-
ter infrastructure. 
The fact that it does not suggests there are many attractive opportu-
nities to improve or add to U.S. infrastructure. It is easy to identify types 
of infrastructure that need improvement or repair. Every four years the 
American Society of Civil Engineers offers a detailed assessment of 
U.S. infrastructure, detailing its strengths and shortcomings across a 
number of categories, including dams, drinking water systems, waste-
water, bridges, inland waterways, and ports (see, for example, Ameri-
can Society of Civil Engineers [2013]). The report pinpoints areas 
where current spending on maintenance falls short of the level needed 
to keep the infrastructure operating at a constant level. For many kinds 
of infrastructure, of course, a growing population and heavier demands 
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The Great Recession and Lessons for Policymaking 63 
require that we invest in new facilities. There was no better time for 
such investment than the years immediately following the financial 
crisis. The government’s borrowing cost for investment spending was 
near a historical low, and the labor and capital resources needed to 
produce additional investment were not being used by households and 
private businesses. The failure to use fiscal policy, particularly public 
investment policy, to bring the nation closer to full employment after 
2009, represents the most notable failure of policymaking in the Great 
Recession. It produced unnecessary suffering for the nation’s long-term 
unemployed, and it wasted a rare opportunity to improve or rebuild the 
nation’s public infrastructure at very low cost. 
EXPLANATIONS 
Policymakers failed to use fiscal policy adequately to deal with 
the slump that followed the 2008 financial crisis. At least two factors 
contributed to this failure. First, technical forecasts of the economic 
fallout from the crisis understated its ultimate severity. Many ana-
lysts may have believed that when confidence in financial institutions 
and financial markets was restored, the nonfinancial economy would 
rebound quickly as normal credit flows resumed. For tens of millions 
of households, however, a functioning financial system did not restore 
their access to credit. For many, their primary asset was their home, and 
that home was worth much less after 2007 than it was before. Fixing 
the financial system did not repair the balance sheets of households 
that borrowed heavily to purchase homes that lost a large share of their 
value. 
By the time forecasters and decision-makers recognized that con-
sumer and business demand would not rebound quickly, the political 
window for enacting an appropriately scaled fiscal program had closed. 
Many voters accepted the verdict that the stimulus program had failed. 
More to the point, they elected politicians to the House of Representa-
tives committed to the idea that additional stimulus would put the cred-
itworthiness of the United States at risk. Many politicians who were 
most committed to addressing the nation’s unemployment problem 
through fiscal policy lost in the 2010, 2012, and 2014 elections. 
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64 Burtless 
Of course, the belief that a stimulus program is needed depends 
crucially on the weight one assigns to the well-being of jobless workers 
and the underemployed. If the distress of the unemployed ranks at the 
top of voters’ concerns, policymakers may be willing to adopt strong 
antirecession measures, even if the policies carry some risk or have 
unpopular side effects such as a larger public debt. In many western 
democracies voters care most intensely about the unemployed when 
long-term unemployment is a plausible risk they face themselves. At 
that point, job loss is not a risk facing some anonymous stranger. It is a 
risk that represents a real possibility for themselves or a family member, 
neighbor, or friend. The Great Recession was like other postwar reces-
sions, both in the United States and in other rich democracies. Work-
ers’ fear of losing their job spiked with the layoff rate and the number 
of front-page stories about new mass layoffs. These stories fall off the 
front page and out of the news cycle when the layoff rate declines, as 
it inevitably does. The suffering of the unemployed slips from voters’
consciousness and seems less urgent to policymakers. 
We saw this in Western Europe in the late 1980s, and I suspect our 
great-grandparents also saw it in the late 1930s. In late-1980s Europe 
and late-1930s America, the unemployment rate remained stubbornly 
high, but layoffs were no longer an immediate concern of workers who 
managed to hang on to their jobs or find new ones. The simple fact is 
that a high level of long-term unemployment is not mainly the result of 
a high current layoff rate but rather the result of the failure of private and 
public employers to create enough new jobs to reemploy long-time job 
seekers and to provide plentiful work opportunities for school leavers. 
Even when the unemployment rate holds steady at 15 percent, it takes a 
great deal of empathy on the part of voters who are safely employed to 
place a high weight on the welfare of strangers who have been without 
work for a long time. Workers’ altruism toward the unemployed gets 
a lift when the layoff rate soars, but when this moment passes, as it 
did after 2009, the welfare of the unemployed sinks lower among the 
concerns of both voters and elected officials. After the moment passes, 
it may be hard to persuade voters that further sacrifices for the unem-
ployed are needed. 
Although voters’ fears about the economic consequences of a larger 
public debt were baseless, they may have been decisive in shifting the 
priorities of policymakers toward fiscal austerity and away from further 
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The Great Recession and Lessons for Policymaking 65 
stimulus. That shift slowed the recovery and worsened the prospects of 
the long-term unemployed as well as young adults trying to begin their 
careers. While those two groups experienced unnecessary additional 
pain as a result of the pivot toward austerity, it is hard to see how the 
policy shift had a beneficial payoff for the voters whose election day 
choices produced the policy shift. 
Notes 
1. http://www.nber.org/cycles.html (accessed October 29, 2014). 
2. Atif, Rao, and Sufi (2013) offer a somewhat larger estimate of the expected loss 
in consumption based on their finding that households with lower net worth and 
higher leverage ratios cut spending more aggressively in response to a decline in 
wealth. 
3. http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/files/scf2013_tables_internal
_real.xls (accessed December 1, 2014). 
4. Workers earning less than the average wage obtain compensation for a larger 
fraction of their earnings loss, while those earning higher wages receive propor-
tionately less generous compensation (Burtless and Gordon 2011; Immervoll and 
Richardson 2013). 
5. In February 2009 the White House published a comparison of the 2009 and 2010 
projections of a number of forecasters. The administration predicted a year-over-
year change in GDP of −1.2 percent; the CBO’s prediction was −0.9 percent; and 
the consensus Blue Chip forecast was −1.6 percent. The actual change in real GDP
was −2.8 percent (the White House 2009). 
6. This represents the average bid yields for all Treasury inflation-protected securi-
ties with remaining terms to maturity of 10 years or more. 
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Central Banking 
in the Great Recession 
New Policies, Old Principles 
Donald Kohn 
Brookings Institution 
In 2007 and 2008 the U.S. financial markets and economy were 
hit with a series of huge shocks. As shown in Figure 4.1, house prices 
started to fall in the summer of 2006 and eventually declined by an aver-
age of 35 percent. A superstructure of mortgage lending that had been 
built on the expectation of ever-rising house prices began to unravel. 
Mortgage loans had been made to increasingly unqualified borrow-
ers and for speculative purposes, and it gradually became evident to 
lenders—and more importantly, creditors of lenders—that these loans 
would not be repaid and that the underlying collateral in many cases 
would be worth less than what was owed on the loans, leaving lenders 
to incur losses. Complicating the picture greatly was the fact that these 
loans had been bundled into securities and then sliced and diced and 
resold so that no one could be sure where the losses would fall. In the 
resulting financial panic and recession, equity prices fell by almost half, 
and the unemployment rate rose from 4.75 percent to over 10 percent 
(see Figures 4.2 and 4.3). 
Ben Bernanke, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, and other 
observers have noted that the initial shock, including the doubts about 
the viability of financial institutions, was larger than that which started 
the Great Depression. Many economists, including Bernanke, have 
attributed the extent and duration of the Great Depression importantly 
to the failure of the Federal Reserve to counter the emerging problems 
aggressively enough. This chapter focuses on what the Federal Reserve 
did in the Great Recession of 2007–2009 to avoid a repeat. To this 
end, it undertook a series of unconventional and largely unprecedented 
67 
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Figure 4.2  Equity Prices, 2007–2009
SOURCE: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC.
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Figure 4.1  House Prices, 2007–2011
SOURCE: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC.
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policy actions. But my hypothesis is that these actions did not come 
from nowhere; rather, they were natural extensions of policies utilized 
in more normal times, founded on past central bank behavior and les-
sons learned from previous experience in tough times, here and in other 
countries. I was the vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Board from 
2006 to 2010, and this account is based in part on my first-hand experi-
ence contributing to the formulation and implementation of many of 
these unconventional policies. 
POLICYMAKING IN A CRISIS
From several perspectives, managing a crisis is extraordinarily chal-
lenging. Although the Fed could and did take some broad lessons from 
history, the few precedents for the situation in the United States were 
either very old or occurred in financial systems that were much differ-
Figure 4.3  Unemployment Rate, 2007–2011
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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ent (the Depression) or much milder (the financial shocks of the 1980s 
and 1990s). In addition, the policymakers did not know the true state 
of the world. Market participants and the Federal Reserve were work-
ing with stale information about lenders and borrowers from outdated 
balance sheets and income statements. The supervisors at the Fed could 
supply more up to date analysis and information, but the situation was 
evolving rapidly, important institutions under fire were not banks and 
hadn’t been subject to close oversight, and people in the private sector 
supplying new information often had vested interests in pushing the 
Fed toward one policy choice or another. We could observe what was 
going on in markets, but market prices were driven by fear and panic 
and did not represent underlying values that were likely to prevail over 
time. The lack of precedent and knowledge of the true state of the world 
meant that the Fed was operating largely under Knightian uncertainty— 
a circumstance in which it could not make good estimates of the prob-
abilities of particular outcomes. 
We had one critical advantage: Ben Bernanke’s leadership. One 
aspect of that good fortune was his leadership style. He remained calm 
under severe stress, providing an anchor for the rest of us. And he was 
open to new ideas—sending out “blue sky” emails with lots of sugges-
tions on new approaches and soliciting the views of others. 
In addition, Bernanke is a leading scholar of the Great Depres-
sion, and he was well aware of the ways that financial crises propagate 
through the economic system. He was also aware of the mistakes the 
Federal Reserve had made that allowed that propagation to occur in 
the 1930s, resulting in an economic crisis of unprecedented length and 
severity. In a 90th birthday celebration for Milton Friedman well before 
the most recent crisis, Bernanke noted that, thanks to Friedman and his 
coauthor, economist Anna Schwartz, we now understood what we—the 
Fed—had done wrong in the Depression, we were very sorry, and we 
promised we wouldn’t let it happen again. The story of 2007–2009 is 
what the Fed under Bernanke’s leadership did to make good on that 
promise. 
The Federal Reserve devised many unconventional and innova-
tive policies to counter the effects of the crisis, but they were based 
on extensions of tried and true central bank policy tools. Those tools 
fell into two broad categories—lending by the Fed through its discount 
window and lowering interest rates in the conduct of monetary policy. 
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Central Banking in the Great Recession 71 
The two policies are not entirely separable: for example, lending at the 
discount window increased the Fed’s balance sheet and led to lower 
interest rates, and the more successful one type of policy was the less 
pressure on the other. But they did have different origins, and this chap-
ter covers each type separately. 
LENDING 
Large segments of the financial sector are inherently fragile, reflect-
ing what we expect from it. When we give it our savings we often want 
to be able to get them back quickly and with the principle intact—we 
want high liquidity. However, when we borrow we do so at longer 
terms, say, for 3–4 years to finance the purchase of a car and 30 years to 
buy a house, or, for a business, for several months to finance inventory 
or several years to finance capital equipment and buildings. So, banks 
and many other financial intermediaries operate with marked maturity 
mismatches: their liabilities—our savings—are far shorter than their 
assets—our borrowing. They also tend to rely very heavily on deposits 
or other borrowing and very little on equity, which is a more expensive 
source of funds, so they are highly leveraged with small cushions of 
equity to absorb losses on their loans and other assets. This fragile struc-
ture rests on confidence—confidence that whenever we want to access 
our savings—for example, to get cash from our deposit or money fund 
investment—we will be able to do so and get the full amount we are 
expecting. 
When people lose confidence in the financial sector, bad things hap-
pen. They recognize that they are more likely to be able to get their 
funds in full and on time if they are near the head of the line; after oth-
ers have withdrawn, the institution may run out of cash or assets that 
can readily be turned into cash. When confidence is lost, we get runs on 
banks or other financial intermediaries. If enough people try to get their 
money back, institutions will be forced to sell often illiquid assets—and 
sell them at any price to meet demands for cash. That results in fire sales 
of assets that can drive the price of the assets well below their intrinsic 
value. 
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In 2007 and 2008 the panic originated from developments in the 
subprime mortgage market, but that triggered much wider duress. As 
house prices declined, people began to realize that many lenders faced 
large losses. However, the mortgages had been packaged together and 
those packages had been broken up and repackaged in complex and 
opaque ways. Consequently, no one could be sure where the losses 
would eventually be absorbed, and there was a more general pulling 
back from lending to a variety of financial institutions. The financial 
institutions under stress needed to sell assets, driving down the price of 
mortgages and other assets even further, raising more questions about 
the viability of lenders and provoking further withdrawals. A Wall 
Street/financial institution death spiral was under way. 
Critically, when lenders are under pressure they pull back from 
making new loans. Credit for households and businesses tightens up, 
or in the extreme dries up entirely. When we can’t borrow to buy goods 
and services we cut back spending, which causes businesses to lay off 
workers, who in turn may have to default on loans and reduce spending 
further, deepening the recession and financial sector stress. The Wall 
Street death spiral becomes a Main Street death spiral. 
The central bank’s tools to deal with a Main Street death spiral are 
limited. The Fed can’t step in and lend directly to households and busi-
nesses—it is not equipped to make those types of decisions, and we 
wouldn’t want an institution that is both public sector and politically 
independent closely involved in allocating credit by picking and choos-
ing among loan applicants. What it can do is intervene in the financial 
sector, reducing the pressure on banks and other institutions to end the 
runs and fire sales and keep credit flowing to Main Street. 
The person who first recognized and formulated the policy for the 
central bank in a panic was Walter Bagehot, and he did so in the middle 
of the nineteenth century, after watching the Bank of England deal with 
financial panics in the City of London. He said the central bank should 
lend to banks and other institutions freely so they can meet deposit 
withdrawals and pay back lenders. Central banks should lend against 
illiquid but still good collateral, giving the banks a source of funds they 
could access without engaging in fires sales of assets. By being ready to 
make liquidity available to banks and other institutions, central banks 
would assure depositors and other lenders that they could get their 
funds back when they asked for them, so they didn’t need to line up to 
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Central Banking in the Great Recession 73 
withdraw, forestalling or at least limiting panics. In effect, the central 
bank would provide liquidity insurance to banks and sometimes other 
intermediaries; special government intervention was justified by the 
key role financial institutions play in the broader economy, intermediat-
ing between savers and spenders and operating the payments system. 
Indeed, the Fed was founded in 1913 in large part because the absence 
of a lender of last resort had made financial panics in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries more destructive than they would have 
been if a lender had been ready to step in. 
But lending freely against good collateral was not the end of Bage-
hot’s advice or of the central bank playbook based on his recommenda-
tions. Any insurance carries moral hazard—it reduces the incentives 
for the buyers of the insurance to take steps to protect themselves. Two 
other elements in the central bank playbook for lending into a panic are 
designed to limit that moral hazard. First, lend only to solvent institu-
tions; do not keep alive institutions that have made so many fundamen-
tally bad decisions they have run through their shareholder capital. And 
second, charge a penalty rate relative to the rates that will prevail once 
market functioning is restored; higher rates mean that the central bank 
will be the lender of last resort—after private sector funds dry up—and 
will induce borrowers from the central bank to repay when markets 
normalize. 
The Federal Reserve implemented the Bagehot-based rule book. As 
Figure 4.4 shows, it lent in great size during the crisis—especially after 
generalized market panic that followed the failure of Lehman Brothers. 
Total discount window lending, which is normally close to zero, shot 
up to nearly $1.8 trillion in early 2009. But it also lent at a penalty to 
market rates, so as markets stabilized and financial institutions were 
recapitalized by the government and in the markets, lending subsided 
fairly rapidly over 2009. 
Although lending mostly followed the Bagehot principles, the 
Fed found it had to innovate in several ways to achieve its objectives 
of stemming the panic and promoting greater availability of credit to 
households and businesses. Banks are the usual counterparties of the 
Federal Reserve at the discount window, but banks became reluctant to 
use the window because they feared looking weak, which might feed a 
run instead of stopping it. This stigma got in the way of the Fed’s ability 
to supply liquidity and avert credit tightening when uncertainty about 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be 
set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your                               
Customer Service Representative if you have questions about fnding this option.
Job Name: -- /402798t
 
 
 
Figure 4.4  Lending by the Federal Reserve
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds.
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counterparty risk disrupted interbank funding markets. It then began to 
make the credit to banks available in auctions in which many partici-
pated so no one stood out. 
A critical characteristic of the events of 2008 was that the panic 
wasn’t limited to the banking system. Figure 4.5 shows intermedia-
tion involving securitization of loans and money market lending out-
side banks themselves—dubbed the shadow banking system—rose 
substantially before the crisis. The securitization of mortgages meant 
that they were spread throughout the financial system and often not 
held in banks. In many respects, that was fine because risk was widely 
dispersed, often among long-term holders. But a lot of the pieces of 
securitized mortgages were held in financial structures that looked 
and behaved like banks in that the long-term mortgages were financed 
by short-term debt and backed by little if any equity to absorb losses. 
Some of those structures were attached in one way or another to banks 
and came back to them as confidence evaporated. But vulnerabilities 
extended well beyond the banking system, and runs spread to broker-
dealers holding mortgage securities, money market funds lending to the 
term money market transactions that are not backstopped by deposit insurance (repos, 
Figure 4.5  Shadow Banking Liabilities, 2000–2014 
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commercial paper, and other MMMF liabilities). Net measure attempts to correct for 
double counting (Pozsar 2010). 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, Haver Analytics. 
broker-dealers, and other elements in this so-called shadow banking 
system. The United States is generally fortunate to have well-developed 
securities and securitization markets alongside its banks; they can keep 
the credit flowing when the banks are in trouble and not lending. But 
in 2008 all elements of the system were subject to runs and fire sales 
as confidence evaporated; the problems in the nonbanks were having 
serious adverse effects on the abilities of households and businesses to 
borrow. In response, the Federal Reserve activated an authorization to 
lend to nonbanks that it hadn’t used since the 1930s. It lent to broker-
dealers, to money market funds, to issuers of commercial paper, and to 
buyers of securitized debt to limit the damage to the economy from the 
panic afflicting financial markets. 
It wasn’t only problems at U.S. banks and markets that were dam-
aging the U.S. economy; many foreign banks also were in trouble in 
their transactions in dollars, and that was feeding back badly on U.S. 
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76 Kohn 
financial markets. In the years leading up to the crisis many foreign 
banks, attracted by the high rates and the high ratings from the credit 
rating agencies, invested in pieces of subprime mortgage securitiza-
tions. These banks were funding those investments with short-term 
borrowings and deposits, often not in dollars but instead with domestic 
deposits the banks subsequently converted into dollars in short-term 
markets, like swap markets. As confidence in the banks waned, they lost 
access to swap markets, and they needed to bid more strongly directly 
in U.S. markets for dollars; this was putting upward pressure on U.S. 
interest rates at a time when the Fed was trying to hold those rates down 
to fight recession. 
The Fed could and did lend directly to foreign banks operating in 
the United States at its discount window, but in many cases it didn’t 
have the information to judge whether the borrowing bank was sol-
vent or whether the collateral it had to offer was sound. So, the Federal 
Reserve lent dollars to foreign central banks to lend to their domestic 
banks, allowing the foreign central banks to make those difficult judg-
ment calls. That lending between central banks was called “central bank 
foreign currency liquidity swaps,” and the loans were unprecedented in 
the size and the purpose for which they were made. 
I have already noted the high degree of uncertainty that faced the 
central bank in coping with the crisis. Of course, the private sector was 
dealing with the same phenomenon. In particular, lenders to financial 
institutions and other borrowers were concerned that they couldn’t 
judge the depth of the likely losses in their counterparties, which could 
prove considerable in a period of unprecedented declines in asset 
prices. Lenders might be willing to take some risk, but the potential for 
very large losses impeded their willingness to extend funding. So, the 
Fed, for several of its facilities (sometimes together with the Treasury’s 
TARP facility) took on this tail risk—it would absorb extremely large 
losses once the private sector had taken some losses. Although the Fed 
didn’t take any losses of this sort, its willingness to do so helped bolster 
private lender confidence and restore the more normal working of the 
markets. 
Did these lending facilities work? Yes, eventually. They didn’t pre-
vent a panic, especially after the failure of Lehman Brothers, but they 
did limit the extent of the damage to the markets and the economy and, 
by boosting confidence, helped to restore more normal functioning of 
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Central Banking in the Great Recession 77 
the markets. They didn’t prevent panic in part because the law requires 
that to activate lending to nonbanks, the Federal Reserve Board must 
find that a deeply problematic situation already prevails—the circum-
stances are “unusual and exigent” and credit is not otherwise avail-
able. By necessity, these nonbank facilities had to be put into place in 
response to panicky situations that had already developed. 
Were they “bailouts”? The funds were advanced when private 
credit was not available, and without the Fed’s lending, many more 
institutions would have gone under. But they were loans, not capital 
injections, for the most part to solvent institutions that were denied 
access to markets because of developments beyond their control, fully 
in keeping with the Bagehot principles and the intent of the writers of 
the Federal Reserve Act. 
However, there were also borderline situations when the liquidity 
needs of troubled institutions were met through special facilities. These 
were uncomfortable for the Fed, but the authorities, including the Trea-
sury as well as the Fed, judged that the failure of the particular institu-
tion would have had major adverse consequences for the economy, and 
alternative methods for dealing with the situation were not available. 
Now they are. The Fed strongly backed a part of Dodd-Frank that gave 
the FDIC, working with the Fed and other authorities, new powers to 
resolve troubled financial institutions without endangering the stability 
of the financial system. Loans to individual troubled institutions are not 
permitted after Dodd-Frank, but the alternative should be effective in 
protecting stability while allowing institutions to fail in an orderly way. 
MONETARY POLICY AND INTEREST RATES 
The second main strand of Federal Reserve policy in the crisis 
involved the setting of interest rates—monetary policy. Through its 
announcements and open market operations to add and subtract reserves 
from the banking system, the Fed exerts very close control over an 
overnight interest rate—the federal funds rate. As Figure 4.6 shows, in 
a recession, the Fed normally reduces this rate to fight unemployment 
and keep inflation from falling much below its target. Lowering the 
federal funds rate—or market expectations that it will be lowered— 
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generally leads to decreased intermediate and long-term interest rates. 
Lower intermediate and longer-term rates make it cheaper for people 
to borrow to buy cars and houses, and for businesses to finance new 
capital equipment and buildings. They also tend to raise asset prices, 
which is especially important for equities and houses because that’s 
what constitutes household wealth, and when people are wealthier they 
tend to spend a little more because they don’t need to save as much for 
the future. Lower interest rates also tend to depreciate the dollar on for-
eign exchange markets as investments in foreign assets look to return 
more relative to investments here in the United States; a lower dollar 
makes our exports more affordable to foreigners and makes their prod-
ucts less affordable for U.S. residents, shifting spending to the output 
of U.S. factories. 
Lower interest rates, higher wealth, and a cheaper dollar all tend 
to boost spending. Greater spending puts people back to work, and the 
Figure 4.6  Federal Funds Rate, 1973–2013
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board and Haver Analytics.
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Central Banking in the Great Recession 79 
extra demand keeps inflation from falling below the Fed’s target or 
causes inflation to rise once it is already below target. In the fall and 
winter of 2008–2009, the United States was in a deep recession, but the 
federal funds rate was already at zero. Fortunately, several economists, 
including Ben Bernanke, had thought about what to do in this situation, 
which Japan had been facing for some time. The advice was to inter-
vene in the financial markets further along the chain—reduce interme-
diate and long-term rates directly, which in turn should stimulate spend-
ing through all the channels mentioned above—cost of credit, wealth, 
and exchange rates. It would also bolster confidence and encourage risk 
taking at a time when lenders were extremely risk averse. Two sepa-
rate techniques were used to reduce intermediate- and long-term inter-
est rates: buying longer-term debt and giving more information about 
policy intentions to lower expectations about the path of interest rates 
in the future. 
The Fed called the first technique large-scale asset purchases, but 
everyone else called it quantitative easing. The assets purchased were 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) guaranteed by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, securities issued by these two agencies, and U.S. Treasury 
bonds. The Fed started by announcing definite amounts—e.g., $1.25 
trillion—but, after several iterations with specific amounts, finished 
with an open-ended commitment to buy long-term Treasuries and MBS 
at a pace of $85 billion per month until the economy had improved 
enough that this extraordinary action was no longer needed. In fact, 
purchases continued at this pace from the fall of 2012 until December 
2013, after which the pace of purchases was phased down gradually 
(tapered) until October 2014, when they stopped altogether. As Figure 
4.7 shows, the securities portfolio of the Fed had reached nearly $4.5 
trillion by that time, up from under $1 trillion before the crisis. 
How was this supposed to work? The purchases had several effects 
on markets. By increasing the demand for the long-term securities that 
were being purchased, they raised the price and lowered the yield. 
Lower yields on Treasuries and MBS caused investors to look around 
for other, higher-yielding, assets, such as equities and corporate bonds; 
and the investors who sold the Treasury bonds and MBS now had cash 
to redeploy to other long-term assets. In these ways, the Fed’s purchases 
in particular segments of the securities markets were transmitted to 
financial markets more broadly. In addition, the announcement of the 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board. 
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Figure 4.7  Federal Reserve Securities Portfolio, 2002–2014 
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purchases likely signaled the Federal Reserve’s determination to use 
unconventional policies to promote a return to full employment and get 
inflation up to its 2 percent target, reinforcing its messages that interest 
rates would be low for a long time. 
The second technique to lower intermediate and longer-term rates 
was to make that message about the expected path for the federal funds 
rate in the future much more explicit than usual—that is, give forward 
guidance on interest rates. The Fed used a variety of formulations of 
its language about the path of rates to convince markets that the rate 
would remain essentially at zero for quite some time—longer than mar-
ket participants might otherwise have anticipated. The expected path 
for short-term rates is a key component in determining long-term rates, 
and the Fed’s intention through its assurances about holding rates low 
for long was to lower longer-term rates—or to keep them from rising 
before the Fed thought it consistent with achieving its employment and 
inflation objectives. 
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Like asset purchases, the specific form of the guidance evolved 
over time. What began as very vague guidance—“for some time” and 
“for a considerable period”—shifted to more precise time-based guid-
ance—“at least through mid-2013” and then “at least through 2014.” 
The language became more focused on economic conditions—“at least 
until unemployment falls below 6.5 percent, provided inflation does 
not exceed the 2 percent target by more than one-half percent”—and 
then moved to a combination of economic conditions keyed to progress 
towards its objectives and time—it would be “patient” in raising rates. 
In 2014, it dropped the “patient” language and focused only on actual 
and expected progress toward its inflation and employment goals. 
The Fed needed to return to these monetary policy tools multiple 
times over an extended period because the recovery from the very deep 
recession was so slow and disappointing. The Fed’s legislation gives it 
two mandates: “maximum employment and stable prices.” Maximum 
employment is interpreted as the highest level that can be sustained 
over time without promoting ever increasing inflation. That goal is usu-
ally expressed in terms of the unemployment rate—how low can it go 
without creating inflation problems. In 2014, the central tendency of 
the participants at Federal Open Market Committee meetings is that the 
unemployment rate could go to 5 to 5.25 percent on a sustained basis 
without untoward inflation developments, and that level was broadly in 
alignment with the estimates of many outside economists at that time. 
But as shown in Figure 4.8, the unemployment rate did not come down 
to that level until early 2015. 
For stable prices the Fed has set a target of 2 percent inflation mea-
sured by the PCE deflator. That goal is plotted in Figure 4.9, along with 
realized inflation. The 2 percent goal is shared by many central banks 
around the world. It’s not zero because that would risk falling into a 
costly deflationary spiral too often. And, inflation below 2 percent on 
average would mean interest rates would be very low on average, giv-
ing the Fed little room to ease its fed funds target if bad things happened 
to the economy. 
Until 2015, the economy operated with a far weaker labor market 
than consistent with “maximum employment”; moreover, in the period 
after the crisis inflation ran consistently below the 2 percent target. The 
Fed anticipated that the recovery from the very deep recession would 
be slower than most recoveries from deep recessions. We entered the 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be 
set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your                               
Customer Service Representative if you have questions about fnding this option.
Job Name: -- /402798t
%
82 Kohn 
Figure 4.8  Unemployment Relative to Full Employment, 2007–2015 
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recession with an overhang of houses on the market, with households 
having incurred unsustainable levels of debt, and with lenders having 
deeply impaired balance sheets as households and businesses defaulted 
on debts in the housing downturn and recession. Rebuilding balance 
sheets takes time and elevated saving. But the economic expansion 
has been disappointing even relative to these restrained expectations, 
and inflation has persisted below target; as actual economic activity 
and prices fell short, the Federal Reserve judged that it needed these 
repeated rounds of policy easing to hit its legislated goals. 
Given that disappointment, did the policy easing work? The stud-
ies of the Fed’s announcements on financial conditions generally have 
shown that the actions were effective in lowering interest rates and rais-
ing asset prices. The effects might have been greatest in the Treasury 
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Figure 4.9  Inflation Relative to Federal Reserve Target, 2007–2015 
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and MBS markets, where the purchases were made, but they seem to 
have fed through to some extent into other markets where households 
and businesses borrow and invest. What is much harder to show, not 
surprisingly considering the lackluster recovery, is that the lower inter-
est rates and higher equity prices had a substantially positive effect on 
spending. Models drawing on historical relationships say they did, and 
so does the logic in this chapter. Some of the “headwinds” the economy 
faced were not anticipated—for example, eurozone problems begin-
ning in 2010, restrictive U.S. fiscal policy in 2012 and 2013, and very 
tight credit conditions continuing for longer than expected in residential 
real estate markets. I believe that the recovery and expansion would 
have been even weaker than we experienced if the Fed had not been so 
aggressive. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ben Bernanke said during the crisis that he didn’t agree with some 
of what Franklin Roosevelt did to get out of the Depression, but he 
admired Roosevelt’s determination to try new things until something 
worked. That was one lesson underlined by the Fed’s response to the 
crisis: in unprecedented circumstances, innovate until you find some-
thing effective. At the same time, those innovations need to be based on 
deep thinking about the nature of the problems and the tools at hand to 
deal with them. The Fed couldn’t inject capital into the financial sys-
tem—that was for TARP—but it could supply liquidity very broadly, 
and it could ease financial conditions through a variety of techniques to 
lower interest rates in order to stimulate spending. 
Among the most difficult aspects of crisis management was explain-
ing to Congress and the public what the Fed did and why. Bernanke 
tried to explain the link between the Fed’s actions and Main Street, for 
example, through two interviews on the TV show 60 Minutes, but the 
unprecedented nature of the actions compounded the problem of expla-
nation; lending is why the Fed was founded, but it hadn’t engaged in 
that sort or scale of crisis management in many decades. There was no 
precedent for the assets purchases it engaged in, allowing the imagina-
tions of some observers to conjure up all kinds of adverse consequences 
that, to date, have not materialized. And transparency about some of 
the actions—for example, who took its loans—could run counter to the 
efficacy of the policy. Public misunderstanding was widespread and 
echoed (and amplified) in the Congress. The Federal Reserve was per-
ceived to be bailing out large banks and Wall Street more generally, 
sometimes perceived to be at the expense of Main Street. On monetary 
policy, it was arguing the counterfactual—it would have been worse 
without its actions. 
Despite the difficulties of explication and understanding, evidence 
and analysis strongly support the conclusion that the Federal Reserve’s 
actions limited the damage to jobs and income from plunging real estate 
prices and expedited the return to the agency’s objective of “maximum 
employment and stable prices.” 
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At present and going forward, activist fiscal policy is likely to be 
essential for the U.S. economy to operate near potential levels of output 
and employment. This view is a substantial departure from the near-
consensus of economists that monetary policy alone could and should 
be left to carry out the stabilization policy mission, a belief that pre-
vailed for nearly a generation prior to the 2008 financial crisis. 
As of 2007, the “Great Moderation” in the United States had lasted 
for 20 years (see Stock and Watson [2003]). Since 1984, fluctuations 
in output and unemployment had been modest and seemed to even out 
over time, and confidence grew that the business cycle had been largely 
tamed. Much of the credit for this experience went to monetary policy, 
which had learned how to coarsely tune if not fine-tune the economy. 
In 1997, it was Paul Krugman who said, “the unemployment rate will 
be what Alan Greenspan wants it to be, plus or minus a random error 
reflecting the fact that he is not quite God” (Krugman 1997). The Fed-
eral Reserve appeared to have the tools to successfully manage aggre-
gate demand to achieve the maximum levels of employment and pro-
duction consistent with rough price stability. 
Ten years ago, most economists likewise agreed that fiscal policy 
should not be a tool for smoothing the business cycle. Instead, the focus 
of good fiscal policy was the right-sizing of government spending and 
the control of budget deficits. Preventing excessive deficits was essen-
tial to maintaining confidence and avoiding unduly high interest rates 
85 
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86 Ball, DeLong, and Summers 
that would slow economic growth. Adding an unnecessary stabilization 
policy mission to fiscal policy, so the near-consensus went, could only 
create distraction and confusion to no benefit. 
But in 2008 the Great Moderation came to an abrupt close, as the 
financial crisis that began a year earlier ushered in the Great Recession. 
On December 5, 2008, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds 
rate below 20 basis points (0.2 percent), using up all its conventional 
monetary policy ammunition. Since then, the Fed has sought to boost 
aggregate demand through the unconventional policies of forward 
guidance and quantitative easing. Yet despite this monetary stimulus, 
the recovery that technically began in the second half of 2009 has been 
dismal in regard to moving output and employment toward their pre-
2008 trends, and also in comparison with previous recoveries from deep 
recessions. 
In some ways, the end of the Great Moderation and the onset of 
the Great Recession have had remarkably little impact on public policy 
debates. The most discussed economic issue in Washington over the last 
four years has been the need for strong action to achieve fiscal consoli-
dation, not the urgency to restore full employment. Even though infla-
tion and employment are both well below target, the vast majority of 
criticism directed at the Fed has been that its policy is too lax. 
One change in public discourse, however, has been a shift from the 
optimism of the Great Moderation to a growing belief that the damage 
to the labor force and economy from the Great Recession is permanent, 
and that we are settling into a “new normal” in which employment lev-
els easily reached before 2008 are now unattainable. 
Although the new economic conditions of the post–Great Modera-
tion era do require substantially new economic thinking, they do not 
warrant an attitude of resignation about a semi-stagnant new normal. 
Ironically, the appropriate new thinking is largely old thinking: tradi-
tional Keynesian ideas of the 1930s–1960s that were largely down-
played in the wake of the stagflation of the 1970s and the accompanying 
“New Classical” revolution in macroeconomic theory. Three concepts 
comprise the most important of these ideas: 1) Keynes’s view that the 
liquidity trap, or zero bound on short-term nominal interest rates, can 
sharply limit the efficacy of monetary stabilization policy; 2) President 
John F. Kennedy’s “Economics 101” view of the desirability of fiscal 
stimulus during a slump; and 3) the possibility that a prolonged epi-
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Fiscal Policy and Full Employment 87 
sode of weak demand and high unemployment in an economy may have 
destructive consequences for aggregate supply (Blanchard and Sum-
mers 1986; Okun 1973). 
After outlining these ideas, we discuss policy implications. In an 
economy with a depressed labor market and monetary policy constrained 
by the zero bound, there is a strong case for a fiscal expansion to boost 
aggregate demand. The benefits from such a policy greatly exceed tradi-
tional estimates of fiscal multipliers, both because increases in demand 
raise expected inflation, which reduces real interest rates, and because 
pushing the economy toward full employment will have long-lasting 
positive effects on the labor force and productivity. 
We argue that in a liquidity trap environment like the one we are 
experiencing at present, properly designed fiscal stimulus is likely to 
reduce rather than increase the long-run debt burden.1 This outcome 
reflects a combination of the direct benefits of stimulus in raising rev-
enues; the favorable impact of increased gross domestic product in 
reducing the debt/GDP ratio; the possibility that fiscal stimulus today 
reduces future spending burdens, such as the cost of deferred main-
tenance; favorable supply impacts of public investments; and pos-
sible reductions in real interest rate costs that come from increases in 
expected inflation. 
We also present new evidence derived from recent research at the 
Federal Reserve. Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013) introduce 
hysteresis on the supply side into the Federal Reserve’s principal mac-
roeconomic model. Hysteresis refers to a situation in which cyclical 
economic downturns diminish the economy’s ability to produce output 
in the future. The finding from this exercise is that a sustained increase 
in government purchases can reduce the long-run debt/GDP ratio, even 
in the absence of direct supply-side benefits from government pur-
chases, and even in the absence of any impact of current purchases on 
future needs for government spending. 
THE DOWNTURN AND THE DISAPPOINTING RECOVERY 
Figure 5.1, from Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013), traces 
the behavior of real GDP (the bottom line) relative to the supply-side 
as estimated by the authors’ state-space model from pre–financial crisis 
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growth trend that the economy appeared to be following before 2008, 
Figure 5.1  Federal Reserve Estimates of Potential Output
SOURCE: Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013).
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data (the top line). In 2013 GDP was approximately 10 percent below 
its previous trend, with output growing too slowly to close this gap. 
(The middle line in the graph is the Fed’s statistical estimate of how 
much of the output loss is permanent, a major focus of what follows.) 
Similarly, it appears that only very limited progress has been made 
in returning employment to normal levels. While unemployment has 
declined substantially, from its peak of 10.0 percent in October 2009 
to 6.7 percent in February 2014, this 3.3 percentage point decline is 
mostly a reflection of labor force withdrawal rather than successful job 
finding. The fall in the official unemployment rate has not been accom-
panied by the 1.0 percentage point rise in labor force participation that 
one would expect based on past recoveries, but rather by a further 2.0 
point decline. Thus, arithmetically, only 0.3 points of the decline in the 
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unemployment rate are due to increases in the employment-to-popula-
tion ratio, and 3.0 points are due to dropouts from the labor force.2 
The employment-to-population ratio peaked at 63.4 percent in 
December 2006, fell sharply to 58.5 percent in October 2009, and since 
then has flatlined, standing today at 58.8 percent. Of particular concern 
are the persistently high rates of long-term unemployment, defined as 
the share of the labor force looking for work for at least six months. 
Since 1975, the average long-term jobless rate has been about 1.0 per-
cent, but over the last downturn it peaked at a historically unprecedented 
level of 4.4 percent, and it remains highly elevated at over 2.0 percent. 
This erosion of labor force participation and of estimates of poten-
tial output since 2007 has no obvious cause related to factor supply or 
technology. Indeed, it has come as a surprise to nearly all forecasters. 
The Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) forecasts of potential output 
as of 2008 included no future growth slowdown. In January 2010, CBO 
projected an average unemployment rate for 2013 of 6.2 percent; the 
actual rate was 7.3 percent. CBO projected a labor force participation 
rate of 65.1 percent for 2014; actual labor force participation in Febru-
ary 2014 was 63.0 percent. 
If we look at history, we can see why economists expected a strong 
recovery from the Great Recession, and we can see why it did not hap-
pen. The worst post–World War II recession before that of 2008–2009 
was the recession of 1981–1982. The unemployment rate peaked at 10.8 
percent at the end of 1982 but then fell rapidly to 7.2 percent with rising 
labor force participation over the following year and a half. Unemploy-
ment was pushed down rapidly by output growth rates of 7–8 percent. 
With that experience as background, it was not unnatural to anticipate 
as of late 2009 a similar recovery from the spike in unemployment. 
This expectation, however, neglected to consider the reasons for 
the 1980s recovery. As documented by Romer and Romer (1994), rapid 
growth after 1982 was fueled by the countercyclical policy of the Fed-
eral Reserve. With short-term nominal interest rates at 15 percent when 
the 1980s downturn began, the Fed had ample room to reduce interest 
rates sharply and continue to reduce them until a strong recovery took 
hold. The Fed also reduced interest rates in 2008, but the loosening 
cycle began with the federal funds rate at 5 percent, and by the end of 
that year the funds rate had already hit its lower bound of zero—just as 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be 
set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your                               
Customer Service Representative if you have questions about fnding this option.
Job Name: -- /402798t
90 Ball, DeLong, and Summers 
economists such as Rudebusch (2009) were estimating that, according 
to standard interest rate rules, the economy needed rates of −4 or −5 
percent for a strong recovery. Such a degree of monetary ease was obvi-
ously impossible: nobody would lend money at a significantly negative 
nominal interest rate rather than hold currency. 
The idea that interest rates can get stuck above the level needed for 
full employment, constraining the effectiveness of monetary policy, is 
the liquidity trap that Keynes (1936) emphasized in his General Theory. 
Through most of the decades since Keynes wrote, the liquidity trap was 
considered a theoretical oddity of little practical importance—a con-
cept useful primarily for designing trick questions on college econom-
ics exams. But U.S. short-term nominal interest rates on safe assets like 
government securities have been stuck at zero for more than five years. 
Japanese short-term safe rates have been below 1 percent for 20 years. 
An escape from the liquidity trap is not imminent. The median FOMC 
participant is now anticipating that as of December 2015 the federal 
funds rate will still be only 75 basis points (0.75 percent). And at every 
stage since 2007, the median FOMC participant has overestimated 
the future strength of the economy, the level of inflation, and the level 
of interest rates. The futures market is more pessimistic, predicting a 
December 2015 federal funds rate of 60 basis points. 
The Fed certainly still has some expansionary policy options. Even 
when the federal funds rate is constrained by the zero bound, the Fed 
can still lower longer-term interest rates by providing forward guid-
ance as to the future path of the short-term rate, and via “quantitative 
easing.” However, as even strong proponents recognize, quantitative 
easing policies raise issues of sustainability, market distortion, efficacy, 
and exit management. Moreover, the experience of both the United 
States and the United Kingdom over the last year raises doubts about 
the credibility of long-term forward guidance. 
As DeLong and Summers (2012) explain at length, the liquidity 
trap magnifies the impact of fiscal policy on economic activity and 
employment. During a liquidity trap, interest rates will not increase 
when a fiscal expansion raises the level of demand, thereby avoiding 
the crowding-out effects that normally arise from fiscal policies. More-
over, with a fixed nominal interest rate, if increases in demand raise the 
rate of inflation, real interest rates fall and investment is stimulated. 
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This last point deserves emphasis. In normal times, the Federal 
Reserve has a preferred level of economic activity given its views on 
output and employment; it therefore can be expected to offset any fiscal 
impacts on growth. This was the logic behind the Clinton 1993 budget 
program. Reducing prospective deficits was expected to and in fact did 
lead to a reduction in interest rates, which in turn crowded in invest-
ment, stimulating growth. 
Under current circumstances, though, fiscal stimulus crowds 
in investment to the extent that it succeeds in raising future demand 
and therefore profit levels, and to the extent that it succeeds in raising 
expected future inflation and thus reduces real interest rates. 
THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF CYCLICAL SLUMPS 
Evidence from Historical Comparisons and Labor Market Studies 
The lessons of economic history suggest that the tepid quality of the 
current U.S. recovery should not be too surprising. For ease of presen-
tation, economics textbooks typically portray recessions as temporary 
events, as part of a “cycle” that is independent of and does not affect the 
longer-run “trend,” and after a recession, losses in output and employ-
ment are reversed within a few years. But empirical support for this 
view comes primarily from the United States between 1873 and 1970 
and is complicated by the fact that the Great Depression of the 1930s 
was followed by the countervailing extraordinary war mobilization of 
World War II. The textbook model of short-term recessions is contra-
dicted by research based on broader international data. International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) studies, such as the 2009 World Economic Out-
look (IMF 2009) that look at post–World War II financial crises, find 
that essentially all of the output decline associated with a typical crisis 
persists for at least seven years, and little or none of the shortfall rela-
tive to the precrisis trend is recovered within that time span. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009) and others have also documented that the output 
losses following financial crises are persistent indeed. The ugly techni-
cal term for these highly persistent effects is hysteresis. 
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Earlier work such as Blanchard and Summers (1986) as well as Ball 
(1999) focused on the effects of deep recessions on the natural rate of 
unemployment. The empirical record showed that increases in unem-
ployment often were highly persistent. In many European countries, 
the recessions in the 1980s and 1990s caused rises in unemployment 
that were never reversed, and unemployment ratcheted up again as the 
2008 crisis spread around the world. There appeared to be a correla-
tion between persistent unemployment-rate increases after a downturn 
and an absence of a strong stimulative monetary response to recession. 
Although the zero bound on interest rates was rarely binding, monetary 
policy was constrained by other factors. Often the key factor was either 
Europe’s current common currency or the system of fixed exchange 
rates that preceded it. Sometimes countercyclical monetary policy was 
precluded by anti-inflationary zeal on the part of policymakers, notably 
Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. The absence of sufficient 
monetary stimulus is a feature that these episodes have in common 
with the recent U.S. experience, as the appropriate monetary policy 
response, at least in the interest-rate-rule calculations of Rudebusch, 
was mathematically impossible. 
The historical evidence for hysteresis is complemented by lines of 
research in labor economics by Davis and von Wachter (2011); Ghyrad 
(2013); Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2012); and many oth-
ers. This work documents substantial deleterious effects of deep eco-
nomic slumps on individual workers who lose jobs—in other words, 
the microeconomic problems that underlie persistent unemployment. 
Lost jobs disrupt careers because workers become less and less likely to 
find new jobs as the length of their unemployment spells increases. An 
experiment by Ghyrad, in which resumes were sent to employers that 
advertised jobs, finds that workers with more than six months of unem-
ployment experienced very low employer response rates—lower than 
those for workers who had less relevant experience but did not possess 
the stigma of a long unemployment spell. 
Even when an unemployed worker finds a job, it is typically lower 
paying than the worker’s previous job. It is striking that this adverse 
effect on earnings is still apparent decades later. 
It is even more striking, as Davis and von Wachter (2011) find, that 
these effects are particularly large when a worker loses a job during a 
recession. A rational-signaling model in which a long unemployment 
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spell reveals that a worker is potentially of a low-productivity type 
would imply that those who lose their jobs due to an aggregate shock 
like a financial crisis are more likely than other unemployed workers to 
reattain employment. 
As Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2012) find, a recession 
also damages the long-term prospects of young workers entering the 
labor force. Those who graduate from college during a recession have 
worse labor market prospects. Once again, the adverse effects on work-
ers’ earnings last for decades. 
Evidence from Federal Reserve Staff Estimates 
These harmful effects on individual workers are not the only 
long-term damage from recessions. As emphasized by Reifschnei-
der, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013), physical investment falls sharply in 
recessions. The pace at which new firms are formed also falls, as does 
research and development by existing firms and the development and 
testing of business models. Distortions of the economy’s relative price 
structure and the shortfall in spending initiated by a recession make it 
difficult to do the economic calculation of whether an investment proj-
ect is profitable. All of these effects make for a less-productive econ-
omy in the long term. 
Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013) currently estimate that 
three-tenths of the 10 percent shortfall of U.S. output relative to the pre-
2008 trend will eventually be reversed but that the rest is a permanent 
downward-level shift in the path of potential output. Today’s level of 
potential output appears to be roughly 7 percent lower than the level 
anticipated before the 2008 crisis. 
Evidence from the Congressional Budget Office Assessment of 
Potential Output 
The Federal Reserve staff assessments of the long-run shadow cast 
on potential output by the Great Recession are consistent with current 
analysis by the Congressional Budget Office. As the weak recovery has 
dragged on, CBO has reduced its forecasts of potential output. The fore-
cast for 2014 made in 2013 is 8.2 percent lower than the forecast for 
2014 made in 2007. Yang (2014) has decomposed this loss of poten-
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tial output into three components. He finds that about 40 percent is 
explained by a long-term decline in projected future labor input mea-
sured by total hours worked, 50 percent is explained by a decline in 
investment and thus in the accumulation path of physical capital, and 
the remaining 10 percent is explained by a fall in the projected growth 
path of total factor productivity. 
A CBO (2014) study suggests that the Great Recession is not the 
reason that potential output has fallen below the path the agency fore-
cast before 2008. “The impact of cyclical weakness in the economy 
accounts for just 1.8 percentage points, or about one-fourth, of the dif-
ference from the 2007 projection, even though the downward revision 
to potential GDP coincided with the severe recession of 2007–2009 and 
the subsequent slow recovery” (p. 2). The report states that the primary 
reason it has reduced its forecasts of potential output is a slowdown in 
trend output growth that began early in the 2000s—but which the agen-
cy’s researchers only detected recently—and it is a coincidence that this 
pre-2007 growth slowdown was only recognized in the aftermath of the 
Great Recession. 
We remain skeptical of CBO’s view. As we noted, research consis-
tently finds that recessions following financial crises cause long-term 
losses in output. The disappointing U.S. growth since 2007 fits this pat-
tern. It is natural to interpret recent experience as a typical example of 
hysteresis, not as some more subtle shift in the economy unrelated to 
the recession that occurred at the same time. 
Moreover, CBO’s position does not appear fully consistent with 
Figure 5.2, which depicts the evolution of CBO’s estimate of poten-
tial 2014 GDP. It is noteworthy that the potential output path declines 
steadily from 2007 to 2014. This pattern appears contrary to the CBO 
claim that revisions are explained by slow growth before 2007 and the 
fact that 2007 was a cyclical peak. If those were the real sources of 
the revisions, they should have been heavily frontloaded relative to 
the downturn—in other words, most of CBO’s revisions should have 
occurred as soon as it recognized 2007 as a peak (the National Bureau 
of Economic Research called it in December 2008). This is not the case. 
As CBO discusses in its 2014 report, its current estimates of poten-
tial output growth are heavily influenced by actual output growth 
between 2001 and 2007, the last two cyclical peaks. A problem with 
this approach is that 2001 was a very strong peak—output appears to 
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Figure 5.2 Estimates of 2014 Potential GDP, at Different Points in Time 
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have risen substantially above potential, as reflected by the unemploy-
ment rate of 3.9 percent in late 2000. The 2007 peak was a weak one—it 
achieved its status as a peak only because growth was halted abruptly 
by the financial crisis. We suspect that the growth of output between a 
strong peak and a weak peak—from a point well above potential to one 
closer to potential—underestimates the trend growth rate. 
THE POTENTIAL FOR RECOVERY 
The U.S. economy is on a path toward long-term underperformance, 
but this outcome is not inevitable. The economy spiraled downward in 
2008 because of a fall in aggregate demand—sharp declines in con-
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sumption and investment resulting from the disruption of the financial 
system and accompanying panic. We believe that a sufficient strength-
ening of demand can push output back toward its pre-2008 trend and 
minimize the long-term damage from the Great Recession. 
Where might stronger aggregate demand come from? We can hope 
for good luck, such as a surge in investment in new technologies, a rise 
in exports driven by economic growth in other countries, or a return 
to normal levels of risk tolerance on the part of savers and financial 
intermediaries. But a more reliable approach is to use macroeconomic 
policy to boost demand. 
During the Great Moderation era before 2008, macroeconomic pol-
icy typically meant monetary policy. In today’s weak economy, the Fed-
eral Reserve should certainly try to support aggregate demand through 
an accommodative policy stance. Economists are actively debating 
how much unconventional monetary policies such as quantitative eas-
ing have contributed to the recovery, the potential for further uncon-
ventional policies going forward, and whatever risks might be created 
by the interaction of a very large Federal Reserve balance sheet and 
our current banking and regulatory system. We will not take a position 
on these complex and unsettled issues. Instead, we will emphasize the 
most straightforward way to stimulate demand at the zero bound: fiscal 
expansion. 
A Role for Fiscal Policy? 
Fiscal expansion could take the form of cuts in net taxes or increases 
in government spending. Well-targeted policies such as public invest-
ment would have important direct benefits because the United States 
has systematically underinvested in public infrastructure capital. But 
for the current discussion the key effect of fiscal policy is the boost that 
it provides to aggregate demand. 
There have been many conflicting claims in the public debate about 
the effects of fiscal policy. Many argue that fiscal expansion is coun-
terproductive because it reduces economic confidence and thus private 
spending by more than it increases public spending. However, there has 
now been enough policy experience and research to reach a clear and 
firm conclusion: fiscal expansion is indeed expansionary in economies 
like the United States today, where interest rates are near the zero bound 
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Fiscal Policy and Full Employment 97 
and therefore there is little risk of crowding out private investment. 
Several years ago, after reviewing a variety of evidence, including 
cross-country and time-series analysis and micro examinations of the 
2009 Obama stimulus, David Romer (2011) concluded that the positive 
effects of fiscal expansion are an issue “that we should view as settled.” 
Since then, Blanchard and Leigh (2013) have found that fiscal multipli-
ers in advanced economies were larger than expected during 2009 and 
2010, with the result that output fell short of IMF forecasts in countries 
that pursued fiscal austerity. Under current conditions, the multiplier— 
the effect of a dollar of spending or of net tax cuts on GDP—appears 
likely to be not just positive but greater than 1.0. 
An economy with a positive multiplier, with hysteresis, and with 
interest rates on short-term government debt at their zero bound has 
very different characteristics from what we used to think of as a nor-
mal economy—one with interest rates even on short-term Treasury debt 
bounded well away from zero, with monetary offsets to fiscal policy 
substantially reducing if not eliminating the multiplier, and with a ten-
dency to rapidly return to a predownturn potential growth path. In what 
we used to see as a normal economy, a fiscal boost had little effect 
on current employment and production and, because it raised the debt/ 
GDP ratio, induced substantial future drag on potential output through 
its amortization costs. But when interest rates are near zero, amortiza-
tion costs are near or less than zero, monetary policy offset is absent, 
and persistent hysteresis effects on the tax base have a very high pres-
ent value. In this setting, a sizable fiscal expansion could go a long way 
toward restoring full employment. A shift to greater austerity would 
have the opposite effects. Either way, decisions about fiscal policy 
today will influence the economy into the distant future. 
Fiscal Policy and Debt in the Long Run 
Our advocacy of a fiscal expansion runs strongly counter to the con-
ventional wisdom, which is that long-run fiscal sustainability requires 
that the government tighten its belt in response to a downturn that 
reduces the tax base, even—or perhaps especially—in the case of hys-
teresis. At a time when the government’s net debt has risen above 70 
percent of a year’s GDP, concerns about the federal government’s debt 
are no doubt legitimate. An increase in the debt/GDP ratio certainly has 
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the potential to reduce the funds available for productive private invest-
ment relative to a counterfactual with a stable debt/GDP ratio. And a 
debt that is or even looks out of control is a threat to financial stability, 
and via its effects on real interest rates an additional drag on capital 
formation even if current debt and deficits are not that large. 
It is natural to think that a cut in net taxes or an increase in govern-
ment purchases increases the national debt, and indeed that is the short-
run effect. In the view of many reasonable people, that fact creates a 
dilemma: a fiscal expansion is good for the unemployment problem, but 
bad for the debt problem. We believe, however, that this tradeoff does 
not really exist. Under current circumstances, the long-run effects of 
fiscal expansion on the debt are benign. 
This conclusion follows from the long-lasting effects of fiscal 
expansion on output. In the presence of hysteresis, a one-time tempo-
rary cut in net taxes increases output into the distant future. A persistent 
output increase creates a persistent rise in tax revenue. These long-term 
fiscal benefits can more than amortize the initial rise in the deficit if the 
real cost of financing government debt remains low enough. 
DeLong and Summers (2012) analyze the conditions under which 
a tax cut pays for itself. The key parameters in their analysis include 
the short-run multiplier, the effect of a tax cut on current output, and 
also the “degree of hysteresis,” the effect of a rise in current output on 
potential output, which is an effect that persists into the future. Another 
key parameter is the marginal tax rate for the economy, the extra tax 
revenue that accrues from an extra dollar of output. For the United 
States, the marginal tax rate is approximately one-third. Together, the 
multiplier, the degree of hysteresis, and the marginal tax rate determine 
the long-run revenue gains from a current fiscal expansion. 
Readers can consult the DeLong-Summers paper for the algebra, 
which also involves the interest rate paid by the government on its debt. 
The bottom line is that, for realistic values of the multiplier and the 
marginal tax rate, and assuming interest rates in the future are not much 
higher than in the past, only a small degree of hysteresis is needed for 
a tax cut to pay for itself. A degree of hysteresis of 0.05 is more than 
sufficient: this means that a $1.00 rise in current output must have an 
effect on potential output of $0.05 through its effects on investment, the 
labor force attachment of workers, and so on. DeLong and Summers 
argue that the degree of hysteresis is likely to exceed this threshold by 
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a substantial margin, based on both historical evidence and the recent 
U.S. experience. 
Calibrating the Analysis 
We can use the estimates of potential output in Reifschneider, 
Wascher, and Wilcox (2013) to produce a simple estimate of the value 
of the hysteresis coefficients η. Figure 5.1 shows the Reifschneider et 
al. state-space model estimates of the path of the output gap γ, measured 
as the difference between potential output (the middle line in the figure) 
and actual output (the bottom line). The output gap peaked at 7.3 per-
cent in the third quarter of 2009. Added up over time, the cumulative 
output gap C(γ) through the first quarter of 2013 equaled 24.9 percent-
age point years of U.S. potential output. 
Let σ for “scarring” or “shadow” be the difference between what 
potential output would have been in the first quarter of 2013 based on 
the pre-2008 trend and where it ended up in that quarter according to 
the Fed estimates. The value of σ = 6.0 percent. The implicit estimate of 
hysteresis η is then simply: 
(5.1) η = σ/C(γ) 
and so η = (6.0)/(24.9) = 0.24. 
The estimate of η, 0.24, far exceeds the level of hysteresis required 
for a tax cut to be self-financing, which is 0.05 or less in the DeLong-
Summers analysis. 
A more sophisticated exercise looks more deeply into the Federal 
Reserve Board/U.S. (FRB/US) macroeconomic model that underpins 
the analysis of Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013) and is one 
of the main tools used by the Federal Reserve. The baseline model 
includes one hysteresis effect: a fall in output reduces physical invest-
ment, which causes a long-lasting decrease in labor productivity. Rei-
fschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox augment this channel with hysteresis 
in the labor market: an output slump has persistent effects on the unem-
ployment rate and labor force participation calibrated to be “roughly 
consistent with the experience of the last few years.”3 In unpublished 
work, Reifschneider and Summers (n.d.) simulate the FRB/US model 
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100 Ball, DeLong, and Summers 
with and without labor-side hysteresis, taking as their initial condi-
tions the state of the U.S. economy at the business cycle trough in 2009 
and anticipation that the federal funds rate would remain at zero for a 
number of years. They derive the effects of an increase in government 
spending of 1 percent of GDP for six years, from 2009 through 2014. 
Figure 5.3 shows the simulated effects of this fiscal stimulus on output, 
potential output, the government deficit, and debt. 
Panel A in Figure 5.3 shows how the additional fiscal expansion 
in 2009 causes output to rise sharply in both versions of the model. 
Panel B shows the corresponding rise in potential output, which is 
much larger in the model that includes hysteresis in the labor market. 
The increase in potential output leads the stimulus to have an effect on 
real GDP that persists even after the policy’s direct effects on aggregate 
demand are gone. 
Panels C and D in Figure 5.3 show that even in the baseline FRB/ 
US model, the debt/GDP ratio eventually falls below the level it would 
have attained without the stimulus. In the model with calibrated labor-
market hysteresis, the debt/GDP ratio immediately falls below and 
always remains below its baseline no-additional-stimulus level. Twenty 
years after the fiscal stimulus begins, this policy has reduced the debt/ 
GDP ratio by 2.2 percentage points. 
There is every reason to expect that these calculations are conserva-
tive. Allowing for a supply-side impact of increased public spending or 
the possibility that increases today would obviate the need for spending 
in the future, as in the case of necessary infrastructure maintenance, 
would augment the reduction in the debt/GDP ratio. 
CONCLUSION 
The weak recovery of the labor market is a national crisis with a real 
human dimension. The effects of job loss, in addition to financial strain, 
include damage to physical and mental health. Studies have linked 
unemployment to higher death rates, particularly immediately after job 
loss, but even in the long run by 10–15 percent for at least the next 20 
years; higher rates of suicide as unemployment duration stretches on; 
and even higher rates of cancer mortality. Furthermore, studies have 
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Figure 5.3  Effects of a 1 Percent of GDP Increase in Federal Purchases 
for Five Years, with and without Labor-Market Hysterisis 
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Figure 5.3  (continued) 
Panel C: Federal Surplus-to-GDP Ratio (NIA Basis) 
Panel D: Debt-to-GDP Ratio 
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Fiscal Policy and Full Employment 103 
found that family members of people who have lost their jobs are also 
affected: being laid off increases the likelihood of divorce in the years 
immediately following the layoff, and children of laid-off workers are 
around 15 percent more likely to have to repeat a grade. Furthermore, 
the longer one is unemployed, the harder it is to find a new job, and 
thus the harder it becomes to escape these terrible costs (Charles and 
Stephens Jr. 2001; Classen and Dunn 2012; Huff Stevens and Schaller 
2009; Lynge 1997; Shimer 2008; Sullivan and von Wachter 2009). 
How can policymakers restore full employment? In our view, it is 
easier than one might think. Economics usually teaches us not to believe 
in a free lunch. But with even a small degree of hysteresis in a standard 
economic model such as the Federal Reserve’s forecasting model, fis-
cal policymakers face an easy decision if the economy is weak with 
low labor demand and if interest rates are stuck at the zero bound. A
fiscal expansion is then a win-win policy. It not only raises employ-
ment and output; it also reduces the long-term problem of government 
debt. Conversely, an insistence on austerity in these circumstances has 
perverse effects: it worsens the debt problem that motivates the policy, 
it prolongs the economic slump, and it magnifies the long-term damage 
to the labor force and productivity. Keynes was right about fiscal policy, 
and Herbert Hoover was wrong about the virtues of belt-tightening dur-
ing an economic slump. 
This past recession will not be the nation’s last, and expansion-
ary fiscal policy will likely be needed again in the future. For reasons 
laid out in Summers (2013), we believe that the safe real interest rate 
necessary for full employment has declined considerably in the United 
States, raising concerns about secular stagnation—the idea that the 
financial conditions necessary for adequate growth and production near 
potential output are likely unsustainable, and that sustainable finance 
is likely to go along with unsatisfactory growth and production well 
below potential output. Under such circumstances, it is likely that the 
zero lower bound on interest rates will be reached more frequently in 
the future than in the past, that fiscal expansion will reduce the need for 
extraordinary monetary policies that potentially create instability, and 
that debt burdens are less problematic because of lower interest rates. 
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Notes 
This paper was prepared as part of the Full Employment Project at the Center for Bud-
get and Policy Priorities, with support from the Rockefeller Foundation. 
1. This idea has a long pedigree, dating back to at least the 1940s, the last time long-
term U.S. government real and nominal interest rates were this low. See Lerner 
(1943). 
2. Some of the labor force decline is due to demography; nevertheless, Hatzius and 
Mericle (2014) suggest that the unemployment gap—the difference between the 
current rate and full employment—is at least 2.5 percentage points, and this is four 
and a half years into an economic expansion. 
3. In the specification of Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2013), labor market 
hysteresis arises when unemployment exceeds its natural rate by 1.25 percentage 
points or more. In this situation, an additional percentage point of unemployment 
in a quarter causes a persistent increase in the natural rate of 0.02 points and a 
persistent decrease in labor force participation of 0.04 points. 
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6 
International Dimensions 
of the Great Recession 
and the Weak Recovery 
Kathryn M.E. Dominguez 
University of Michigan and NBER 
The global economic slowdown that followed the U.S. financial 
crisis in 2008 was deeper and longer lasting than any previous eco-
nomic downturn other than the Great Depression. Indeed, the downturn 
is widely referred to as the Great Recession, testimony to its severity in 
comparison to other postwar recessions, while at the same time delin-
eating it as a recession and not a depression. Worldwide GDP fell by 
over 15 percent during the Great Depression. The global GDP decline 
during the Great Recession was much lower—around 1 percent—but 
the slow pace of the recovery from the recent downturn is unprece-
dented. This chapter will examine the reasons for the weak recovery 
from the Great Recession. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011, 2014) make a 
strong case for why recessions precipitated by financial crises are likely 
to be more severe than those caused by other factors, which is undoubt-
edly part of the explanation.1 The international dimensions of the recent 
financial crisis are also significant contributors to both the diffusion and 
persistence of the weak recovery. 
COMPARISONS TO THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
The Great Depression started with major economic contractions in 
the period 1930–1933, but the U.S. economy rebounded strongly in the 
subsequent three years with an average growth rate of 11 percent. In 
contrast, the Great Recession only lasted six quarters, but growth rates 
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have only averaged 2.2 percent over the six subsequent years. Figure 
6.1 compares annual real GDP growth in the United States during the 
1930s to current growth rates. It dramatically illustrates that the depth 
of the Great Depression far exceeded our recent experience, while at 
the same time showing the relatively slow pace of the current recovery. 
Economists have long studied the causes and consequences of the 
Great Depression, and among the many lessons learned from that expe-
rience was that fiscal and monetary policy decisions in that time period 
likely exacerbated the severity and persistence of the downturn (Brown 
1956; Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Keynes 1936; Romer 1992; Temin 
1989). Figures 6.2 and 6.3 compare the fiscal and monetary policy 
responses taken during the Great Depression relative to actions taken 
in the wake of the Great Recession. As DeLong (1998) describes, the 
U.S. government did not consider economic stabilization, let alone full 
employment, as one of its responsibilities prior to the Great Depres-
Figure 6.1  Comparing the Great Recession to the Great Depression,  
in Annual Real GDP Growth
SOURCE: US. Bureau of Economic Analysis: Real GDP, not seasonally adjusted, bil-
lions of chained 2009 dollars.
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Figure 6.2  U.S. Fiscal Policy Response Comparison 
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, US. Office of Management and Bud-
get: Federal surplus or deficit [-] as percent of GDP (FYFSGDA188S) was first con-
structed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in October 2012. It is calculated 
using Federal Surplus or Deficit [-] (FYFSD) and GDP (GDPA): FYFSGDA188S = 
[(FYFSD/1000) ÷ GDPA] × 100 FYFSD ÷ 1000. 
sion. The government borrowed to pay for wars and attempted to run 
surpluses during peacetimes to pay off the accrued debts, which led 
to the principle that the only good peacetime budget was a balanced 
budget. It was not until the passage of the Employment Act of 1946 
that the federal government was required to actively manage the macro 
economy, though by 1931 U.S. fiscal deficits started to rise as a conse-
quence of the congressional override of Hoover’s veto of the veterans’
bonus (Hausman 2016) and other relief expenditures, as well as the 
collapse in tax revenues. The fiscal response to the Great Recession 
was, in comparative terms, strong and swift. Figure 6.2 also shows the 
fiscal response to the recession in 1982, which was far stronger than 
was the case in the 1930s but less aggressive than the approach taken 
after 2008. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; St. Louis Monthly Reserves and Mon
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etary Base. 
2009 provided around $800 billion in tax cuts and federal spending to 
stimulate the economy, and various other programs (Cash for Clunkers, 
the extension and expansion of the housing tax credit, the job tax credit, 
and extensions of emergency unemployment insurance benefits) added 
another $200 billion in stimulus spending. 
The U.S. monetary response to the Great Recession was also dra-
matically different from the approach taken in the 1930s. As is evident 
in Figure 6.3, it was not until the United States left the gold standard in 
1933 that monetary policy became more expansionary during the Great 
Depression. In contrast, the Federal Reserve’s immediate and unprec-
edented approach to providing liquidity to financial markets began with 
a half-point reduction in the federal funds target rate (to 4.75 percent) in 
September 2007, followed by further reductions that brought the target 
rate down to a range of 0 to 0.25 percent by December 2008. In 2007, 
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the Fed created a Term Auction Facility (TAF), which provided banks 
with additional access to liquidity. This was followed by a series of 
extraordinary credit mechanisms: in March 2008, the Term Securities 
Lending Facility (TSLF), which allowed banks and eventually non-
bank financial institutions to exchange less-liquid securities for U.S. 
Treasury bills; the Commercial Paper Funding facility; and the Term 
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). In October 2008, the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 was passed, which pro-
vided up to $700 billion to the Fed to purchase a wide array of illiquid 
assets through the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). In 2009 the 
Fed announced its first round of quantitative easing, which involved the 
purchase of $1 trillion of securities, and in 2010 it announced a second 
round of $750 billion. 
The aggressive U.S. policy response to the financial crisis was, and 
remains, controversial. The efficacy of specific policies, the size of the 
programs, and the approach to implementation will likely be debated 
for decades to come. Lessons from the Great Depression clearly spurred 
policymakers to action, and it seems likely that the policies, at the very 
least, delayed the slowdown in U.S. growth. However, fiscal and mon-
etary policy actions, whether because they were not aggressive enough 
or because other factors complicated their efficacy, were not able to 
head off the Great Recession. 
FORECASTING THE GREAT RECESSION 
Are major economic downturns predictable? Dominguez, Fair, and 
Shapiro (1988) find no evidence that contemporary forecasters realized 
that a major economic downturn would follow the 1929 stock market 
crash. Likewise, there is little evidence that professional or government 
forecasters could predict the Great Recession. Figure 6.4 shows the 
probability distributions of U.S. GDP growth calculated by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York before and after the Lehman Bank failure 
in September 2008. The solid line in the figure is based on data avail-
able up to November 2008, and the dashed line is based on data avail-
able through April 2008. The actual depth of the Great Recession was 5 
percent; in April 2008 the Fed forecasters attributed less than 3 percent 
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Figure 6.4  Forecasting the Great Recession: Probability Distribution 
before and after the Lehman Failure 
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mate outcome, and it was only by November 2008 that the probability of the actual 
outcome was close to 15%. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York research staff; Potter (2011). 
probability to this outcome, and even in November 2008 the probability 
of the actual outcome was only 15 percent. 
It was not just forecasts of the U.S. economy that missed the mark— 
there is little cross-country evidence that forecasters could predict the 
global downturn. Figure 6.5 shows the International Monetary Fund’s 
(IMF) average rolling forecast errors over various horizons starting in 
1990 and ending in 2012 for 188 countries. Forecast errors were gen-
(percentage points, annual average) 
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Figure 6.5  IMF’s Rolling Forecast Errors by Horizon, 1990–2012  
-
-
-
-
0.0 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
h=0 (Current year) h=1 
h=2 h=3 
h=4 h=5 
−  
−  
−  
−  
NOTE: Forecast error = forecast − actual. Actual data as of December 2013; forecasts 
for 0-to 5-year horizons; 188 countries. 
SOURCE: IMF’s World Economic Outlook (1990–2012 vintages); Figure 12 in Ho and 
Mauro (2014). 
erally positive in the 1990s, meaning that the IMF forecast exceeded 
actual GDP growth. Between 2000 and 2007 forecast errors were nega-
tive, indicating that economic growth was stronger than what IMF fore-
casters expected. In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, fore-
cast errors again swung positive, with five-year horizon forecast errors 
nearing an unprecedented 3 percent. 
FORECASTING THE RECOVERY 
Although most forecasters missed the depth and severity of the 
Great Recession, they seem to have largely anticipated the slow recov-
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ery. Dominguez and Shapiro (2013) examine real GDP forecasts and 
forecast revisions starting in 2009 by the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters (SPF) maintained by the Philadelphia Fed, the Eurozone Survey 
of Professional Forecasters maintained by the European Central Bank 
(ECB), and the IMF World Economic Outlook forecasts. Figure 6.6 
shows actual real U.S. GDP from 2007 to 2012 (the solid line) along 
with average eight-quarter-ahead SPF forecasts (the dashed lines) start-
ing at the trough of the Great Recession (mid-2009). The SPF forecasts 
are initially overly pessimistic, but over time they track actual GDP
growth closely, and revisions of the outlook consistently shift down-
ward over time. In 2012 the SPF forecasts predict a downward shift not 
Figure 6.6  U.S. Real GDP Forecast: Actual and Survey of Professional 
Forecasters, 2007–2014 
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NOTE: Real GDP, billions of chained 2005 dollars, quarterly, seasonally adjusted (solid 
line), real-time mean eight-quarter ahead Survey of Professional Forecasters as calcu-
lated in Dominguez and Shapiro (2013) (dashed lines). The shaded area indicates the 
dates of the Great Recession as determined by the NBER. 
SOURCE: Dominguez and Shapiro (2013, Figure 1). Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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only of the trend path but also in the growth rate of GDP. Importantly, 
as Dominguez and Shapiro (2013) emphasize: “Nowhere in the forecast 
horizon since the 2009 trough have forecasters projected a return to the 
pre–Great Recession trend path” (pp. 149). Figure 6.7 shows that this 
“new normal” of not returning to the previous trend path of GDP is also 
evident in the actual and SPF forecast data in the aftermath of the 1991 
and 2001 recessions. The “old normal” of a rapid return to the previous 
trend path is only evident after the 1981 recession. 
It is interesting to note that when we compare the recent U.S. recov-
ery to recoveries from the four previous post–WWII recessions, trend 
GDP growth across all five recoveries looks fairly similar in the first 
few quarters, but then we see evidence of a negative shock about a year 
into the recovery after the 1973, 1981, and 2008 downturns. However, 
instead of the quick reversal to stronger growth that we saw in the 1970s 
Figure 6.7  U.S. Real GDP Forecast: Actual and Survey of Professional 
Forecasters, 1981–2011 
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Figure 6.8  U.S. Real GDP Recovery Comparisons
NOTE: Real GDP billions of chained 2009 
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and 1980s, Figure 6.8 shows that the recovery in the recent period never 
experiences a growth uptick. Table 6.1 provides a comparison of his-
torical recoveries across the past 11 NBER-dated recessions. The Great 
Recession stands out for sustaining the largest 4-quarter GDP decline at 
the start of the recession, and the smallest GDP rise over the subsequent 
10 quarters. 
What might account for the unusually slow pace of the recovery 
after the Great Recession? One factor that the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) has emphasized is the concomitant reduction in potential 
GDP. “CBO estimates that about two-thirds of the difference between 
growth in real GDP in the current recovery and the average for other 
recoveries can be attributed to sluggish growth in potential GDP” (CBO 
2012, pp. 2–3). Figure 6.9 shows actual real GDP starting in 2003 to the 
present, along with the precrisis trend, and CBO’s estimate of potential 
GDP. The slower growth in potential GDP is, in turn, largely attributed 
to “long-term trends unrelated to the cycle, including the nation’s chang-
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annual rate. NBER business cycle dates: http://www.nber.org/cycles.html (accessed 
June 1, 2017). 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be 
set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your                               
Customer Service Representative if you have questions about fnding this option.
Job Name: -- /402798t
 
International Dimensions of the Great Recession and Weak Recovery  117 
Table 6.1  GDP Growth: Historical Recovery Comparisons 
Recession % change from peak at start of recession 
Start End 4 quarters 8 quarters 12 quarters 14 quarters 
Nov. 1948 Oct. 1949 −1.6 11.6 17.3 18.7 
July 1953 May 1954 −2.2 5.2 7.5 9.1 
Aug. 1957 April 1958 −0.9 6.0 8.4 7.7 
April 1960 Feb. 1961 −1.0 6.4 10.3 13.8 
Dec. 1969 Nov. 1970 0.4 9.2 14.5 14.6 
Nov. 1973 March 1975 −2.0 0.5 4.8 8.1 
Jan. 1980 July 1980 1.6 −0.9 0.6 4.9 
July 1981 Nov. 1982 −2.7 2.8 9.8 11.8 
July 1990 March 1991 −0.7 2.3 5.3 7.2 
March 2001 Nov. 2001 1.5 3.3 7.3 9.0 
Dec. 2007 June 2009 −3.3 −3.8 −0.8 −0.4 
Average without recession −0.7 4.6 8.6 10.5 
of 2007–2009 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
ing demographics” (CBO 2012, pp. 3). Past recoveries were helped by 
favorable demographic trends coming from increases in labor force par-
ticipation of women and the strength of the baby boom, while the most 
recent recovery coincided with the retirement of baby boomers. 
BUSINESS CYCLE COMOVEMENT 
When America sneezes, the world catches cold—meaning, busi-
ness cycles across the globe are increasingly synchronous with the U.S. 
cycle.2 Ng and Wright (2013) provide an excellent survey of business 
cycle facts, updated to include the data from the Great Recession, and 
find strong evidence that recessions with financial market origins are 
different from those driven by supply or monetary policy shocks, and 
that when countries are more financially integrated, business cycles are 
more synchronous. In real business cycle models with complete mar-
kets, financially integrated economies will correlate negatively, leading 
to low synchronicity. However, if we (realistically) allow for the exis-
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Figure 6.9  Great Recession GDP, Precrisis Trend, and CBO Potential 
GDP Estimate 
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tence of financial frictions that impede perfect risk sharing, business 
cycle models generally predict higher synchronicity when countries are 
more financially open and connected (Baxter and Crucini 1995). 
Business cycle comovement is likely to increase when trade and 
financial linkages are stronger and policy responses are more similar. 
Figure 6.10 shows how U.S. trade volume (measured as imports plus 
exports as a share of GDP) has evolved over time; trade fell precipi-
tously during the Great Recession, providing an important channel 
through which the downturn in the United States spread to the rest of 
the globe. However, the fact that trade volume bounced back to pre-
recession levels by early 2010 suggests that the trade channel is unlikely 
to be an important contributor to the slow global recovery. Cross-country
holdings of assets grew dramatically in the early 2000s, and interest-
ingly, while the rapid growth in foreign ownership of U.S. assets has 
largely returned to its prerecession trend line, the growth in U.S. hold-
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ings of foreign assets has leveled off. This pattern tracks the recovery of 
global financial markets and returns; the U.S. recovery has been unusu-
ally slow, but the recovery in the rest of the globe has been even slower. 
The timing of policy responses to the global downturn have also 
contributed to business cycle synchronicity. The European Central 
Bank held its target interest rate constant for a full year after the Fed 
started on its expansionary path, and initially it looked as if most devel-
oping countries would not be dragged down by the unfolding finan-
cial crisis in the advanced countries. By mid-2009, however, the Great 
Recession had become a global recession, and most countries followed 
the U.S. policy lead by implementing expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policy programs (Almunia et al. 2010). Toward the end of 2009 the 
U.S. economy looked as if it were on the brink of a robust rebound, and 
although the rest of the world was playing catch-up, economic fore-
casts were relatively optimistic for the global economy.3 This upbeat 
forecast was fairly quickly reversed when the financial/fiscal problems 
in Europe began to be better understood. In 2011 global forecasts were 
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substantially revised downward as a result of the combination of nega-
tive news from Japan due to the earthquake and tsunami, the euro-wide 
consequences of the ongoing debt crisis in Southern Europe, and the 
U.S. fiscal impasse, which led Standard and Poor’s to downgrade U.S. 
government debt. Additional negative news continued in 2012, when 
the eurozone, the U.K., and Japan returned to recession; in 2013, when 
Cyprus and Portugal required bank bailouts and the U.S. government 
shut-down briefly; and in 2014, with Japan again returning to recession 
and the Russian Ruble crisis. 
COMBINING NARRATIVE EVIDENCE WITH FORECASTS 
Real-time economic forecasts provide high-frequency information 
about the perceived state of the economy based on available data. Like-
wise, narrative information from contemporaneous news reports and 
government announcements help to identify the policy and financial 
market shocks to the global economy that potentially influenced the fore-
casts. Dominguez and Shapiro (2013) follow in the tradition of Ramey 
and Shapiro (1998) and Romer and Romer (2010) to combine forecast 
revisions with narrative information in the years immediately following 
the Great Recession to better understand the reasons for the slow U.S. 
recovery. They argue that the U.S. recovery from the Great Recession 
was stalled in 2010, 2011, and 2012 by negative shocks mainly emanat-
ing from Europe. Table 6.2 updates the narrative evidence through 2014 
and includes a broader group of countries in the analysis. Whereas most 
news concerning the Great Recession is centered on the United States 
in 2008–2009, the focus shifts to the eurozone starting in 2010, to Asia 
in 2011, and to Russia in 2014. 
Table 6.3 documents the revisions in the two-year cumulative eco-
nomic outlook for 14 countries over the period 2009–2014 using the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook forecasts. These forecast revisions 
in the IMF’s outlook for the United States align well with the narra-
tive evidence summarized in Table 6.2. Negative shocks from Europe, 
Asia, and Russia led to substantial downward revisions in growth pros-
pects for countries in these regions, and these shocks also seem to have 
adversely impacted the outlook for the United States. 
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Table 6.2  Percent of Occurrences of Recession-Related Policy and 
Financial Market News Events 
U.K. & Russia Eurozone 
Year U.S. news Asia news news news 
2008 55 10 11 24 
2009 52 15 10 23 
2010 33 2 3 62 
2011 13 20 2 65 
2012 8 21 6 65 
2013 20 11 7 62 
2014 9 18 27 45 
SOURCE: Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, BBC News, Federal Reserve websites, 
U.S. Treasury, European Central Bank, European Commission. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The slow recovery from the Great Recession has lowered prospec-
tive standards of living for people in the United States and around the 
world. The consequences of the high levels of unemployment, especially 
for those who were just starting their working careers when the reces-
sion hit, are likely to be felt for many decades to come. Older workers 
whose savings and pension plans were devastated by the financial crisis 
are unlikely to ever recuperate those losses. Moreover, the slow pace 
of recovery in business investment, worker productivity, and consumer 
confidence suggests that even those not directly hit by the recession will 
be affected. It is difficult to fully explain these outcomes based only on 
U.S. economic conditions, even if we consider the precipitating finan-
cial crisis and CBO’s estimates of the reduction in potential GDP. The 
international dimension of the weak recovery is unsurprising given the 
complex interdependencies of the global economy. The 2008 financial 
crisis started in the United States but soon spread around the globe. 
The aftershocks from this crisis and the subsequent Great Recession 
continue to reverberate in Europe, Asia, and Russia, along with their 
own homegrown economic crises. These combined shocks in turn have 
prolonged and weakened the global recovery. 
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Table 6.3  Revision in Two-Year Cumulative GDP Growth Outlook 
Nether-
U.S. Cyprus France Germany Greece lands Portugal Spain Korea Japan Iceland U.K. Russia China 
122 
2009 3.2 −2.6 1.0 2.7 1.1 2.7 1.8 −0.1 4.1 2.3 −3.6 2.6 2.1 3.1 
2010 −0.5 −0.2 −0.2 0.5 −3.1 0.7 −1.4 −0.3 −1.1 −0.9 1.4 −1.0 2.1 −0.6 
2011 −2.2 −2.4 −0.8 −1.6 −6.1 −0.3 −2.7 −1.0 0.3 0.5 −0.7 −1.5 −0.9 −1.0 
2012 −0.5 −3.5 −1.8 −1.2 −7.9 −0.9 −2.7 −2.9 −0.7 −0.9 0 −1.8 −0.2 −1.1 
2013 −0.7 n/a 0.2 −0.1 0.1 −1.5 0.3 −1.1 −0.4 −0.3 0 0.7 −1.6 −2.0 
NOTE: Revisions from the second to fourth quarter of the forecast for the cumulative percent change real GDP two years ahead. 
SOURCE: IMF World Economic Outlook reports, April 2009–October 2014. 
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Notes 
1. See also Romer and Romer (2015), who argue that output declines following 
financial crises are highly variable and depend importantly on the severity and 
persistence of the financial distress itself. 
2. This is thought to be a modern adaptation of a nineteenth century saying attributed 
to Austria’s Prince Clemens von Metternich, originally: “When France sneezes all 
Europe catches a cold.” 
3. See the IMF’s World Economic Outlook forecasts for 2009 in Table 6.3. 
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